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133 
LORILLARD TOBACCO CO. V. REILLY:1 THE 
SUPREME COURT SENDS FIRST AMENDMENT 
GUARANTEES UP IN SMOKE BY APPLYING THE 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE TO CONTENT-
BASED REGULATIONS 
“But I would have thee remember that if thou shoulds’t become a non-
smoker, it will be because thou hadst decided for thyself . . . for every 
man has a free will to accept or reject tobacco unless it has, by its very 
nature, taken such a hold on him as to compel him to make a choice in 
its favour.”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps every man does have a free will either to accept or reject 
tobacco, but the fact tobacco is addictive is undeniable.3  Add to that the 
fact tobacco claims hundreds of thousands of lives each year4 and costs 
the United States millions of dollars,5 and it is easy to see why 
                                                                                                                                 
 1. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 2. ESTHER WANNING, MEDITATIONS FOR SURVIVING WITHOUT CIGARETTES 7 (1994) 
(citing A.A. WILLIAMS, A SMOKER’S PILGRIM’S PROGRESS (1922)). 
 3. American Lung Association Fact Sheet: Smoking, at 
http://www.lungusa.org/tobacco/smoking _ factsheet99.html (last modified June 2002) (on file with 
the Akron Law Review).  “Nicotine is an addictive drug, which when inhaled in cigarette smoke 
reaches the brain faster than drugs that enter the body intravenously.  Smokers become not only 
physically addicted to nicotine; they also link smoking with many social activities, making smoking 
a difficult habit to break.”  Id.  Moreover, nicotine is not the only chemical found in cigarettes; they 
are known to contain “at least 43 distinct cancer-causing chemicals.”  Id. 
 4. Id.  According to the American Lung Association, tobacco is responsible for the deaths of 
approximately 440,000 Americans each year.  Id.  Included in this figure are the deaths of babies 
born prematurely to mothers who smoke, and those whose diseases are the result of secondhand 
smoke.  Id.  While lung cancer is the disease that most comes to mind when cigarettes are 
mentioned, tobacco is responsible for a host of other diseases including emphysema, chronic 
bronchitis, coronary heart disease, and stroke.  Id.  Smoking has also “been linked to a variety of 
other conditions and disorders. . . .”  Id. 
 5. Id.  “Smoking costs the United States approximately $150 billion each year in health-care 
costs and lost productivity.” Id.  However, in 1998, the gross domestic product for tobacco 
manufacturers was 17.9 billion dollars.  U.S.CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 452 (2000).  Tobacco is also a major export.  See generally Susan M. Marsh, U.S. 
Tobacco Exports: Toward Monitoring and Regulation Consistent with Acknowledged Health Risks, 
1
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government regulation has become widespread in this area.6  
Nevertheless, while Congress may legislate tobacco advertising to some 
extent,7 not all legislation has been found constitutional.8  This is due, in 
                                                                                                                                 
15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 29, 29-33 (1996) (discussing the conflicting goals between discouraging tobacco 
because of its health risks and promoting it because of its value as an export).  See also Andrea J. 
Hageman, Note, U.S. Tobacco Exports: The Dichotomy Between Trade and Health Policies, 1 
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 175, 175 (1992) (“The conflicting goals of promoting tobacco exports and 
discouraging smoking have created a dichotomy in U.S. policy.”).   
 6. Centers for Disease Control, Select Actions of the U.S. Government Regarding the 
Regulation of Tobacco Sales, Marketing, and Use, at 
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/overview/regulate.htm (last updated August 12, 2002) (listing the 
important tobacco regulations beginning with the Food and Drug Act of 1906 and ending with 
recent regulations) (on file with the Akron Law Review). 
 7. Several legislative acts have shaped the way tobacco has been advertised in this country 
for roughly 30 years.  The first important act was the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act of 1965.  Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1340 (1994)).  This act required cigarette labels to carry the warning “Caution: Cigarette Smoking 
May Be Hazardous to Your Health.”  Id.  In 1969, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act 
required a new warning label which required the statement “Warning: The Surgeon General Has 
Determined that Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health.”  Pub. L. No. 92-222, 84 Stat. 87 
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)).  At this time, there was also an 
electronic ban, which prohibited cigarette advertising on the radio and television.  Id.  This Act also 
prohibited the states from regulating cigarette advertising for health-related reasons.  Id.  In 1973, 
the Little Cigar Act extended the electronic ban to include little cigars.  Pub. L. No. 93-109, 87 Stat. 
352 (1973) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)).  In 1984, the Comprehensive 
Smoking Education Act established four warnings, which were to be rotated on cigarette packages 
and advertisements.  Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1331-1340 (1994)).  These warnings stated: (1) Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease and 
May Complicate Pregnancy; (2) Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your 
Health; (3) Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low 
Birth Weight; and (4) Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.  Id.  In 1986, the 
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act established three warnings similar to 
those instituted for cigarettes, which were to be placed on smokeless tobacco packages and 
advertisements.  Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 4406 
(1994)).  These warnings stated: (1) This Product May Cause Mouth Cancer; (2) This Product May 
Cause Gum Disease and Tooth Loss; and (3) This Product is not a Safe Alternative to Cigarettes.  
Id. 
 8. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).  In Brown & 
Williamson, the Supreme Court held that the FDA does not have the authority to regulate the 
marketing of tobacco products.  Id. at 126.  This decision came as the result of regulations issued in 
1996, that attempted to address the problem of tobacco use by adolescents.  Id. at 127.  The 1996 
regulations, some of which were mirrored in Lorillard, would have prohibited the sale of cigarettes 
and smokeless tobacco to minors, required retailers to check the ages of purchasers with photo 
identification, prohibited the sale of packages containing less than twenty cigarettes, prohibited free 
samples of cigarettes, prohibited the sale of cigarettes in vending machines in locations accessible to 
minors, required black and white only advertising in areas accessible to minors, prohibited outdoor 
advertising in areas within one-thousand feet of public playgrounds and schools, prohibited the 
distribution of promotional items containing a brand name, and prohibited the tobacco 
manufacturers from sponsoring events.  Id.  See generally Gerald W. Griffin, Note, Looking Past a 
Smoke Screen: A First Amendment Analysis of the Food and Drug Administration’s Rule Restricting 
Tobacco Advertising, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 363 (1997) (arguing that the 1996 regulations violate the First 
2
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large part, to the First Amendment’s protection against government 
interference with advertising.9 
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Supreme Court examined 
the extent to which the First Amendment protects tobacco advertising.10  
With teenage smoking on the rise,11 the focus and blame is often on 
advertising.12  In fact, even tobacco manufacturers have attempted to 
institute programs designed to curb youth smoking.13  Yet, Lorillard 
demonstrates that while tobacco companies may be willing to join the 
                                                                                                                                 
Amendment because they restrict commercial speech); Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine 
Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA’s Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1996) 
(discussing the FDA’s authority generally and the government’s interest in controlling the use of 
tobacco products); Kathleen M. Paralusz, Ashes to Ashes: Why FDA Regulation of Tobacco 
Advertising May Mark the End of the Road for the Marlboro Man, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 101 
(1998) (discussing in depth the federal legislation which was subsequently invalidated by the Brown 
& Williamson decision). 
 9. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 10. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 532 (2001). 
 11. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CHARTBOOK, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
76 (2000).  “Smoking among adolescents has increased in recent years.  In 1999 the prevalence of 
current cigarette smoking was 27 percent higher than in 1991; current cigarette smoking increased 
56 percent among black students, 29 percent among Hispanic students, and 25 percent among white 
students.”  Id.  More importantly, it is estimated that over 80 percent of adults who smoke began 
doing so when they were adolescents.  Id.  It is thought that while adolescents are aware that there 
are risks to smoking, they do not think that the risks apply to them.  Paralusz, supra note 8, at 89. 
 12. AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, supra note 3 (stating that tobacco advertising encourages 
adolescents to begin smoking before they are capable enough to understand the associated health 
risks).  See also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Article, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: 
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) (discussing the impact of 
market manipulation in selling products); Paralusz, supra note 8, at 91 (noting the causal connection 
between cigarette advertisements and teen smoking).  It is thought that teens are more attentive than 
adults to cigarette advertising.  Michael Schudson, Symbols and Smokers: Advertising, Health 
Messages, and Public Policy, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 208, 216 
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993).  The fact teens smoke the most heavily 
advertised brands seems to prove this.  Paralusz, supra note 8, at 92 (citing David A Kessler et al., 
The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Tobacco Products, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 998, 
992 (1996)).  The volume of such advertising can be illustrated by the fact that in 1999 the tobacco 
industry spent approximately $481,200,000 on tobacco related advertising.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
supra note 5, at 579. 
 13. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co., Youth Smoking Prevention, at 
http://www.lorillard.net/card.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2001) (on file with the Akron Law Review).  
Lorillard Tobacco Company sponsors a Youth Smoking Prevention Program.  Id. The company 
believes “that the most effective way to encourage kids not to smoke is through responsible and 
thoughtful programs . . . .  In addition to the consumer-directed initiatives, [Lorillard believes] one 
of the most effective ways of reducing underage smoking is [by] restricting access to tobacco 
products.”  Id.  Along with other tobacco companies, Lorillard sponsors the “We Card” retail 
program, which can be seen in both print and media broadcast advertising.  Id.  This, however, is a 
marked change in position by the tobacco manufacturers.  See Paralusz, supra note 8, at 94 (noting 
that at one time tobacco companies had strongly denied marketing their products to children, but 
that evidence in response to litigation proved otherwise). 
3
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fight against youth smoking, they are not willing to give up their First 
Amendment rights.14  Lorillard also illustrates that while the First 
Amendment is not easily displaced, its guarantees are continually 
wearing away.15 
This note examines why the Supreme Court’s application of the 
commercial speech doctrine to purely “content-based”16 regulations 
erodes First Amendment guarantees.17  Section II provides a brief history 
of the First Amendment and discusses the different levels of judicial 
scrutiny applied in First Amendment cases.18  Section III provides the 
statement of facts, the procedural history, and the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lorillard.19  Finally, Part IV examines the decision in 
Lorillard and discusses why the Court should have applied strict 
scrutiny to the regulations at issue.20 It further discusses how the Court’s 
refusal to apply strict scrutiny to content-based commercial regulations 
is in direct contravention of First Amendment principles.21 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The First Amendment — History and Overview of Protected Forms 
of Speech 
1.  The Intent of the Framers 
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech.22  However, 
                                                                                                                                 
 14. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 540.  See generally DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: 
A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001) (exploring in depth the inner 
workings of the tobacco industry and its political struggles against the United States government). 
 15. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgement) 
(maintaining that strict scrutiny is necessary when regulations seek to restrict speech based on the 
ideas conveyed). 
 16. Technically, all regulations subject to the commercial speech doctrine are content-based.  
See infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.  However, the use of the term “content-based” 
throughout this Note refers to those regulations, or types of regulations, which are normally subject 
to strict judicial scrutiny in order to uphold First Amendment guarantees. 
 17. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 18. See infra notes 22-74 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 75-140 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 141-272 and accompanying text. 
 21. Id. 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  In pertinent part, the First Amendment states “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”  Id.  The First Amendment became applicable to 
the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states “[n]o State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  See also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (noting that 
4
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the Framers did not provide much guidance as to the First Amendment’s 
meaning.23  As a result, much of its significance must be inferred from 
legislative history,24 from the writings of those who drafted the 
Constitution,25 and from the time period in general.26  Even though not 
much concrete information about the First Amendment’s meaning exists, 
free speech is “considered by many to be the cornerstone of [a] 
democratic society”27 where the search for truth is paramount.28 
                                                                                                                                 
the First Amendment is applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 23. ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (1941) (discussing that 
the drafters of the First Amendment found free speech important, but that they do not say much 
about the exact meaning).  See also Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-
History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 749 (1993) (discussing that the First 
Amendment does not explain such critical words as speech, freedom, and abridging).  It is 
surprising there is not more information on the exact meaning of the First Amendment because a 
substantial controversy surrounded its creation.  See Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First 
Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156 (1986) (examining in detail the history and process of the 
drafting of the First Amendment). 
 24. Denbeaux, supra note 23, at 1171.  Moreover, 
The only sustained consideration of the meaning of the [F]irst [A]mendment by anyone 
with authority to speak was by Madison in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts – 
almost ten years after the drafting of the amendment. Madison said of the [F]irst 
[A]mendment: “The article of amendment, instead of supposing in Congress a power 
that might be exercised over the press, provided its freedom was not abridged, was 
meant as a positive denial to Congress of any power whatsoever on the subject . . . .” 
Id. (citing Letters from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789), in 4 J. MADISON, 
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 506, 545 (Philadelphia 1865)). 
 25. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech? 76 VA. L. 
REV. 627, 632 (1990) (“One searches in vain for an indication from any of the people involved with 
the drafting of the [F]irst [A]mendment that they were concerned with anything besides politically 
oriented speech.”)  In fact, James Madison stressed to the House of Representatives that freedom of 
speech was “necessary to protect the rights of citizens to criticize government officials.”  Id. (citing 
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434-36, 440-43 (J. Gales ed., 1789), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 141, 145 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987)). 
 26. See generally Scott Sullivan, Note, Tobacco Talk: Why FDA Tobacco Advertising 
Restrictions Violate the First Amendment, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 743, 747-49 (1997) 
(discussing the history of the First Amendment as gathered from the popular opinion of colonial 
America).  However, “[t]he persistent image of colonial America as a society that cherished 
freedom of expression is a sentimental hallucination that ignores history.”  LEONARD W. LEVY, 
INTRODUCTION TO FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, xxix (Leonard W. Levy 
ed., 1966).  There is little evidence that colonists would receive “advocates of obnoxious or 
detestable ideas.”  Id.  In fact, when opinions that did not conform were expressed, they were likely 
to be in violation of the seditious libel laws.  Id. at xxx. 
 27. Diane Ritter, Note, The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Future of Tobacco 
Advertising After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1505, 1505 (1997) 
(citing THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1966)). 
 28. Benjamin Franklin’s “Marketplace of Ideas” theory stressed the concept that if all 
opinions were expressed, the truth would overcome error.  Benjamin Franklin, An Apology for 
Printers, in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, supra note 26 at 4-6.  However, 
it has been stated that Franklin was not really a proponent of free speech.  Leonard W. Levy, Ben 
Franklin’s Creedo for Colonial Printers, in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, 
5
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2.  Protected Forms of Speech 
The Supreme Court has divided speech into classes — each of 
which is given a different level of protection.29  Speech is classified as 
either content-based30 or content-neutral.31  Content-neutral speech is 
subject to intermediate judicial scrutiny.32  Content-based speech is 
subject to different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on whether the 
speech is low-value, high-value, or commercial.33 
B.  Content-Based Regulations – Strict Scrutiny for the Most Protection 
Speech that is regulated based solely on its content is generally 
given the most First Amendment protection.34  However, even certain 
                                                                                                                                 
supra note 26, at 3.  In fact, “his few essays on freedom of the press . . . . [w]ere derivative, flaccid, 
and unanalytical, almost anti-intellectual.”  Id. 
 29. Kathleen J. Lester, Student Article, Cowboys, Camels, and Commercial Speech: Is the 
Tobacco Industry’s Commodification of Childhood Protected by the First Amendment? 24 N. KY. 
L. REV. 615, 635 (1997) (citing GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1086 (1996)).  
But see THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 345 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis 
J. Mahoney eds., 1987) (stating that the Framers of the Constitution are often seen as antidemocratic 
because of the type of government that they created). 
 30. See infra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.  See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (holding regulations that prohibit speech based on the subject matter are 
content-based and invalid). 
 31. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570 (1991) (finding ordinance that 
regulated public nudity was content-neutral because the state’s interest was in regulating nudity and 
not expression). 
 32. Id.  Content-neutral speech restrictions are those that regulate without reference to the 
content of the speech.  Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988).  They regulate the time, place, and 
manner of the speech at issue, even though the regulations may have an incidental effect on the 
speakers.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  Content-neutral regulations 
must pass the intermediate judicial scrutiny test that was set forth in United States v. O’Brien.  391 
U.S. 367 (1968).  The O’Brien Court stated that a government regulation passes constitutional 
muster if (1) it is within the constitutional powers of the government, (2) it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest, (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free speech, and (4) the incidental restriction on free speech is no greater than essential.  Id. at 377.  
The Court has recently added a fifth prong to the test, which requires that the regulation must leave 
open ample alternative means of communication.  City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994).  
But see Richard A. Seid, Article, A Requiem for O’Brien: On the Nature of Symbolic Speech, 23 
CUMB. L. REV. 563, 576 (1993) (arguing intermediate scrutiny is little more than a slightly 
heightened rational basis review). 
 33. Lester, supra note 29, at 635 (discussing how the Supreme Court has divided speech into 
low value and high value speech).  See also Scott D. Matthews, Note, Will NASCAR Have to Put on 
the Brakes?: The Constitutionality of the FDA’s Ban on Brand-Name Tobacco Sponsorship in 
Motor Sports, 31 IND. L. REV. 219, 235 (1998) (discussing the level of judicial scrutiny reserved for 
commercial speech). 
 34. But see Toni Elizabeth Gilbert, Note, Economic Regulation of the Cable Television 
Industry: Reigning in a Giant at the Expense of the First Amendment, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 615, 
621-23 (1996) (noting certain forms of speech, such as obscenity and fighting words can be 
6
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content-based restrictions may be upheld.35  For instance, low-value 
speech is entitled to no First Amendment protection.36  Some examples 
of low-value speech are fighting words,37 incitements-to-riot,38 and 
obscenity.39  High-value speech, which includes political, literary, 
artistic, and scientific speech, is given the most protection.40 
                                                                                                                                 
restricted even if the statutes are content-based).  Statutes that are content-based are “subjected to a 
more rigorous judicial inquiry” because of the great importance placed on free speech.  Elizabeth 
Buroker Coffin, Casenote, Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board, 18 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 593, 612 (1993).  See also Karl E. Robinson, Comment, Content is in the Eye of the 
Beholder: The Supreme Court Upholds the Constitutionality of the 1992 Cable Act’s “Must-Carry” 
Provisions, 20 J. CORP. L. 691 (1995) (discussing the significance of the free speech clause as it 
relates to content-based regulations).  But see Laura V. Farthing, Note, Arkansas Writers’ Project v. 
Ragland: The Limits of Content Discrimination Analysis, 78 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1960 (1990) (stating 
the Supreme Court has failed to clearly articulate the definition of “content-based”).  Farthing 
argues: 
The Court uses a functional test to make this “content-based” determination: if one has 
to look at the content of the communication in order to decide whether the 
communication falls into one category rather than another, then the distinction is 
“content-based.”  Superficially, the definition is clear; on closer examination, however, 
the definition blurs.  The Court uses the term “content-based” to denote several 
distinctions, without analyzing whether all pose equal dangers to the values protected by 
the [F]irst [A]mendment. 
Id.  (citations omitted). 
 35. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
 36. Id. at 572.  In Chaplinsky, the defendant was convicted of violating a statute that 
prohibited a person from addressing another person with offensive words in public.  Id. at 569.  The 
Court affirmed the appellant’s conviction, finding “fighting words” are low value speech and are not 
entitled to First Amendment protection.  Id. at 571-72.  According to the Court: 
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under 
all circumstances.  There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or “fighting” words – those which by their very utterance inflict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 
Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted). 
 37. Id. at 572. 
 38. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 379 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring) (finding speech 
that is likely to cause imminent, immediate, or serious harm is not entitled to First Amendment 
protection), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (increasing the 
standard for incitement to riot to more than mere advocacy). 
 39. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  In Miller, the Court stated that: 
[T]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average person 
applying contemporary community standards” would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; 
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. 
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).  If the work meets the above-stated guidelines, it is considered 
obscenity and entitled to no First Amendment protections.  Id. at 26. 
 40. See id.  However, even obscenity is entitled to First Amendment protection if it has 
7
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Most content-based statutes must pass strict judicial scrutiny.41  In 
order to pass strict scrutiny, the government must: (1) show a compelling 
interest, (2) narrowly tailor the regulation to promote that interest, and 
(3) ensure there is no less restrictive alternative available.42  Generally, 
expression will prevail over government regulations43 unless strict 
scrutiny is satisfied.44 
                                                                                                                                 
“serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. . . .”  Id. 
 41. Coffin, supra note 34, at 613.  “A statute which burdens the exercise of protected speech 
or expression based upon the content or ideas contained within the expression itself will pass 
constitutional muster only if it meets the test of strict or exacting scrutiny.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
However, certain content-based restrictions are not put through the rigors of a strict scrutiny 
analysis because they are considered per se unconstitutional.  See Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (finding the University of Virginia’s policy 
regulating the funding of newspapers was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination). 
  “Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the 
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”  Id. at 829. (citations 
omitted).  Moreover, “[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken 
by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”  Id.  It is 
often hard to tell what constitutes viewpoint discrimination and what is merely a content-based 
regulation that should be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis.  See Nicole B. Casarez, Public 
Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REV. 
501, 512 (2000) (discussing the difficulty the Supreme Court has had in distinguishing between 
content-based regulations or viewpoint discrimination).  There are several reasons why viewpoint 
discrimination harms the First Amendment.  See Anthony J. Colletta, Abridgments of Free Speech 
Which Discriminate on the Basis of Viewpoint: Finzer v. Barry, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 127, 142 
(1986).  According to Colletta: 
A viewpoint-discriminatory abridgment of speech distorts public debate by silencing one 
point of view while providing an opposed viewpoint with exclusive control of a 
particular forum.  Since this kind of one-sided debate is precisely what the [F]irst 
[A]mendment seeks to prevent, viewpoint-discriminatory statutes must be held 
unconstitutional, especially where viable viewpoint-neutral alternative [sic] exist. 
Id.  Moreover, mere attempts by the government to restrict certain viewpoints may “impair the 
practice of free speech in a society.”  James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the 
Problem of Judicial Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 477 (1996).  For a 
discussion of how the Massachusetts regulations may constitute viewpoint discrimination, see infra 
Part IV. 
 42. U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (holding restrictions 
requiring cable operators to scramble sexually explicit programs, or to restrict such programming to 
certain hours, failed the strict scrutiny test because there were less restrictive means). 
 43. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding a restriction on the display of signs in 
front of a foreign embassy failed strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored). 
 44. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (finding strict scrutiny satisfied for a 
regulation aiming to prohibit individuals from campaigning within one hundred feet of an election 
polling place). 
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C.  The Commercial Speech Doctrine — The Middle Ground of 
Intermediate Scrutiny 
1.  The Early Cases — Creation of the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine 
At one time, the Supreme Court held that commercial speech was 
entitled to no First Amendment protection.45  Nevertheless, in Bigelow v. 
Virginia, the commercial speech doctrine was created to offer limited 
protection for speech that proposed a commercial transaction.46  The 
Bigelow Court balanced the public’s interest in receiving information 
with the state’s interest in preventing the speech.47  Bigelow, however, 
did little for commercial speech because the Court narrowly limited the 
holding to the facts of the case.48 
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., the Court expanded the commercial speech doctrine.49  
                                                                                                                                 
 45. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942), limited by Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 
U.S. 809 (1975), overruled by Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  In Valentine, the respondent was forbidden from distributing 
flyers, which he had drawn up to advertise his submarine.  Id. at 52.  It was a violation of a New 
York ordinance to distribute such flyers unless they provided “information or a public protest.”  Id. 
at 53.  The Court denied the respondent’s challenge to the bill, finding that there was no protection 
of speech that was solely commercial.  See id. at 55.  According to the Court, “[w]hether, and to 
what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such 
activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative 
judgment.”  Id. at 54. 
 46. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826 (1975).  In Bigelow, the appellant was convicted under a statute 
making it a misdemeanor to advertise abortion services.  Id. at 811.  In reversing the conviction, the 
Court distinguished the facts in Bigelow from the facts in Chrestensen.  Id. at 821-22.  Chrestensen, 
the Court stated, merely proposed a commercial transaction.  Id. at 822.  Moreover, the Court stated 
that Chrestensen did not stand for a “sweeping proposition” that all advertising was unprotected.  Id. 
at 820.  Looking at the facts presented in Bigelow, the Court stated “the advertisement conveyed 
information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience – not only to readers possibly in 
need of the services offered, but also to those with a genuine curiosity about [the issue]. . . .”  Id. at 
822. 
 47. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826.  The State’s interest in Bigelow was in providing quality 
medical care.  Id. at 827. 
 48. Id. at 826. 
 49. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.  In Virginia Pharmacy, the State Board of Pharmacy 
prohibited “advertising or other affirmative dissemination of prescription drug price information. . . 
.” Id. at 752.  The Court noted the importance of the consumer’s interest in the information, and it 
generalized “society also may have a strong interest” in the information.  Id. at 763-64.  According 
to the Court: 
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless 
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what 
reason, and at what price . . . . It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the 
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial 
9
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The Court based the expansion of the commercial speech doctrine on the 
theory that the First Amendment protects the right to disseminate 
information.50  The Court also noted the importance of the public’s right 
to receive information.51  However, in Virginia Pharmacy, First 
Amendment protection of commercial speech was strictly limited to 
truthful, non-deceptive advertising.52 
Even though First Amendment protection of commercial speech 
began with Virginia Pharmacy, it was not until the landmark case of 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York that the commercial speech doctrine became well 
established.53  The importance of Central Hudson lies in the fact that the 
Court decided intermediate scrutiny was appropriate for commercial 
speech.54  The Court articulated a four-prong test that balanced the 
government’s interests with the interests that are served by the 
commercial speech.55  First, the speech must not be misleading or related 
to unlawful activity.56 Second, the government must have a substantial 
interest in regulating the speech.57 Third, the regulation must directly 
serve the substantial interest.58 Finally, the regulation must be no more 
extensive than necessary.59 
                                                                                                                                 
information is indispensable. 
Id. at 765. (citations omitted). 
 50. Id. at 756-57 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972)). 
 51. Id. at 763-64. 
 52. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 771 (1976).  See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (finding 
advertising of contraceptives entitled to First Amendment protection because it was truthful and 
nonmisleading); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding attorney advertising cannot be 
prohibited where the advertising in question was not misleading); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 
U.S. 350 (1977) (holding non-misleading attorney advertising protected by the First Amendment). 
 53. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n,  447 U.S. 557 (1980).  See also 
Joshua A. Marcus, Note, Commercial Speech on the Internet: Spam and the First Amendment, 16 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 253 (1998) (stating Central Hudson appeared to address the issue 
of commercial speech by developing a “permanent test”). 
 54. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. 
 55. Id. at 564.  It is important to note the Court acknowledged that commercial speech is 
afforded less constitutional protection than high value speech, therefore “[t]he protection available 
for particular commercial expression turns on the nature of the expression and of the governmental 
interests served by its regulation.”  Id. at 563. 
 56. Id. at 564.  According to the Court, the government has less power if the speech is non-
misleading and truthful.  Id. 
 57. Id.  “The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on 
commercial speech.”  Id. 
 58. Id.  “[T]he restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may 
not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.”  Id. 
 59. Id.  “[I]f the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on 
commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”  Id. 
10
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2.  The Later Cases — Application of the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine 
Although the Central Hudson analysis has been upheld for many 
years, the Court has “applied the test with varying degrees of scrutiny.”60  
For instance, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of 
Puerto Rico, the Court upheld a statute restricting the advertising of 
casino gambling.61  The Court focused primarily on the state’s interest in 
protecting the welfare of its residents.62  The effect of Posadas was 
ultimately to weaken the commercial speech doctrine by affording 
deference to the states.63  Ironically, in the later case of Edenfield v. 
Fane, the Court rejected any deference to the state.64  The Edenfield 
Court reasoned that the state could not satisfy Central Hudson with 
“mere speculation or conjecture.”65 Edenfield illustrates that the Central 
Hudson test is malleable and inconsistently applied because it takes an 
opposite approach from the one taken in Posadas.66 
More evidence of the flexible nature of Central Hudson can be seen 
in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.67  In Edge Broadcasting, the 
Court considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that regulated 
                                                                                                                                 
 60. Howard K. Jeruchimowitz, Note, Tobacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech 
Balancing: A Potential Cancer to Truthful, Nonmisleading Advertisements of Lawful Products, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 432, 447 (1997) (discussing the varying degrees to which the Court applies 
Central Hudson in order to uphold various statutes).  See also Matthews, supra note 33, at 237 
(stating the Supreme Court has continually struggled to consistently apply the Central Hudson test). 
 61. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 331 (1986).  
The statute at issue made it unlawful for casino owners to direct their advertising toward the citizens 
of Puerto Rico.  Id. at 332.  In upholding the statute, the Posadas Court found the first two prongs of 
Central Hudson were fulfilled.  Id. at 340-43.  While the Court found overwhelmingly the 
regulations directly advanced the government interest, it also found the regulations were no more 
extensive than necessary.  Id. at 342-43. 
 62. Id. at 341.  The Court had “no difficulty in concluding that the Puerto Rico Legislature’s 
interest [was] in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.”  Id. 
 63. Marcus, supra note 53, at 266. 
 64. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993).  See also Marcus, supra note 53, at 268.  In 
Edenfield the Court considered the constitutionality of a solicitation ban applicable to certified 
public accountants.  507 U.S. at 763.  The Court found the ban was unconstitutional and violated the 
First Amendment.  Id.  Resting its decision on the third prong of Central Hudson, the Court found 
the regulation at issue did not directly advance the government’s purpose.  Id. at 771. 
 65. Id. at 770.  According to the Court, “a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction 
on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will 
in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”  Id. at 770-71. 
 66. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342.  In analyzing the third prong of Central Hudson, the 
Posadas Court merely relied on what the legislature believed.  Id.  The Court stated, “[t]he Puerto 
Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the advertising restrictions at issue here, that 
advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the 
demand for the product advertised. We think the legislature’s belief is a reasonable one . . . .”  Id. 
 67. U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421 (1993). 
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the broadcast advertising of lotteries.68  The Court ultimately found the 
statute constitutional, but did so in a way that implied “a piecemeal 
approach to solving the problem would be acceptable.”69 Again, the 
Court changed its position — this time reverting back to the position it 
had taken in Posadas.70 
In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court decided whether a 
statute prohibiting the advertisement of liquor prices was 
constitutional.71  In finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court 
showed that it was “still deeply divided on many commercial speech 
issues.”72  In fact, several Justices indicated uncertainty surrounding the 
commercial speech doctrine.73  Lorillard  is the most recent commercial 
speech case to come before the Court.  It, too, reveals uncertainty 
surrounding the commercial speech doctrine and its application to First 
Amendment issues.74 
                                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. 
 69. Marcus, supra note 53, at 269. 
 70. Id.  For instance, in examining the third prong of Central Hudson, the Court indicated it 
would not require cold, hard proof that the regulation directly advanced the government interest.  
Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 434.  This is in direct contradiction with Edenfield.  507 U.S. at 771.  
The Edge Broadcasting Court stated “[i]f there is an immediate connection between the advertising 
and demand, and the federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to reason that the policy of 
decreasing demand for gambling is correspondingly advanced.”  509 U.S. at 434. 
 71. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 72. Marcus, supra note 53, at 270. 
 73. Marcus, supra note 53, at 273.  For instance, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 
indicated that different regulations may be deserving of differing levels of protection.  44 
Liquormart, 518 U.S. at 501.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia mentioned he shared “Justice 
Thomas’s [sic] discomfort with the Central Hudson test, which seems . . . to have nothing more than 
policy intuition to support it.”  Id. at 517.  These two comments illustrate that the application of the 
commercial speech doctrine is not consistent.  See Marcus, supra note 53, at 273.  According to 
Joshua A. Marcus: 
Although twenty years have passed since the Court first explicitly gave commercial 
speech First Amendment protection in [Virginia Pharmacy], the commercial speech 
doctrine is still not a settled area of law.  Despite a plethora of cases reaching the Court, 
there is still debate about the extent of the protection commercial speech deserves.  The 
Central Hudson test, which was believed to be an “end all” test, has metamorphosed and 
is still under attack.  However, many guiding principles have emerged from the [Virginia 
Pharmacy] progeny which will be useful in determining whether commercial speech . . . 
can be regulated. 
Id.  See also Sean P. Costello, Comment, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech 
Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681 
(1997) (examining the impact of 44 Liquormart on the commercial speech doctrine and discussing 
why strict scrutiny should have been applied). 
 74. See infra Part IV. 
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III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of the Facts 
In November of 1998, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
entered into a settlement agreement with major manufacturers in the 
tobacco industry.75  This agreement, known as the Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA),76 settled pending claims77 against the tobacco 
manufacturers in exchange for monetary and injunctive relief.78  
However, the Massachusetts Attorney General felt that the MSA did not 
                                                                                                                                 
 75. Alan E. Scott, Article, The Continuing Tobacco War: State and Local Tobacco Control in 
Washington, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2000).  Forty-six other states entered into the 
agreement as well.  Id. 
 76. See generally Robert L. Kline, Tobacco Advertising After the Settlement: Where We Are 
and What Remains to be Done, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 621 (2000) (discussing the Master 
Settlement Agreement); Lori Ann Luka, Note, The Tobacco Industry and the First Amendment: An 
Analysis of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 297 (1999-2000) (analyzing 
the Master Settlement Agreement under Central Hudson’s four-part test); Walter Henry Clay 
Mckay, Reaping the Tobacco Settlement Windfall: The Viability of Future Settlement Payment 
Securitization as an Option for State Legislatures, 52 ALA. L. REV. 705 (2001) (discussing the 
terms of the Master Settlement Agreement and the problems involved in securitzation of the 
payment). 
 77. See generally Scott, supra note 75, at 1100.  According to Scott, the tobacco industry had 
been able to defeat private lawsuits for a number of years.  Id.  However, plaintiffs’ attorneys had 
begun to discover damaging documents, which proved the tobacco industry was partially to blame 
for many tobacco related deaths.  Id.  According to Scott: 
Perhaps the most damaging new weapon . . . was the availability of new internal tobacco 
company documents that came to light through previous litigation and tobacco-industry 
whistleblowers.  These documents revealed that the tobacco [industry] had been aware of 
the detrimental health effects of smoking since at least 1953, had suppressed the results 
of internal research, and had deliberately attempted to create doubt and controversy 
about the health effects of smoking in the minds of the American public. 
Id. (citations omitted).  New lawsuits began to emerge and the states began to sue the tobacco 
industry “to reclaim medical expenses . . . spent on tobacco related illnesses.”  Id. 
 78. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533 (2001).  In general: 
  [The settlement agreement banned] all advertising using cartoons, but not human 
figures . . . .  Tobacco ads on billboards, buses, and subway cars [were] banned, but 
outdoor ads smaller than fourteen square feet [were] permitted.  Tobacco advertising in 
sports arenas and venues [were] banned, but tobacco companies [were] each allowed to 
sponsor one sporting event a year for each brand they manufacture.  The tobacco 
companies agreed not to target youth, but [would] print no additional and unequivocal 
health warnings on their packages. 
  In the [settlement agreement], the participating manufacturers and the attorneys 
general state they [were] “committed to reducing underage tobacco use.”  To that end the 
[agreement] set unit minimums of twenty cigarettes per pack and limited free gifts and 
samples.  However, no provisions regulate[d] self-service displays, point-of-sale 
advertising, or vending machines. 
Scott, supra note 75, at 1103 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
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address all pertinent tobacco-related issues.79  Accordingly, the Attorney 
General created the regulations at the center of the Lorillard litigation.80  
These regulations attempted to restrict “outdoor advertising, point-of-
sale advertising, retail sales transactions, transactions by mail, 
promotions, sampling of products, and labels for cigars.”81 
B.  Procedural History 
1.  District Court — First Ruling (Preemption) 
The Lorillard litigation began when the Plaintiffs82 (hereinafter 
“Tobacco Companies”) filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, seeking a determination as to whether the 
Massachusetts regulations83 had been preempted by federal law.84  The 
                                                                                                                                 
 79. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 533:   
At the press conference covering Massachusetts’ decision to sign the agreement, then-
Attorney General Scott Harshbarger announced that as one of his last acts in office, he 
would create consumer protection regulations to restrict advertising and sales practices 
for tobacco products.  He explained that the regulations were necessary in order to “close 
holes” in the settlement agreement . . . . 
Id. 
 80. Id. at 533-34.  In 1999, the regulations were created pursuant to the Attorney General’s 
authority under the Massachusetts General Laws, ch. 93A, § 2 (1997).  Id. at 533.  This act prevents 
unfair or deceptive trade practices.  Id.  The regulations promulgated under the Massachusetts 
General Laws restricted advertising practices in an effort to prevent adolescents from using 
cigarettes, cigars, and smokeless tobacco.  Id. 
 81. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 534. 
 82. The plaintiffs in Lorillard were: Lorillard Tobacco Company, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company, Philip Morris Incorporated, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, and United 
States Tobacco Company.  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 76 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 83. First, the Tobacco Companies challenged the provision that outlawed tobacco advertising 
if visible from the outdoors and if located within one thousand feet of public playgrounds, 
playground areas in public parks, elementary schools, or secondary schools.  Id. at 127-28.  Second, 
the Tobacco Companies challenged the provision that outlawed all tobacco advertising placed 
below five feet from the floor in stores if those stores were located within one thousand feet of 
public playgrounds, playgrounds areas in public parks, elementary schools, or secondary schools 
and if minors would have access to the stores.  Id. at 128.  This type of advertising is known as 
“ground-level advertising.”  Id.  Third, the Tobacco Companies challenged the provision that 
outlawed promotional techniques like samplings, give-aways, mail distributions, and non-tobacco 
gifts given in consideration of purchase, without first verifying age.  Id.  Lastly, the Tobacco 
Companies challenged the provision that allowed retailers only one black and white, five hundred 
and seventy-six square inch sign outside, which could state only the phrase “Tobacco Products Sold 
Here.”  Id. This type of advertising is known as “tombstone advertising.”  Lorillard, 76 F. Supp. 2d 
at 128.  For the full text of the Massachusetts regulations, see 940 C.M.R. §§ 21.01 – 22.09 (2002). 
 84. Id. at 127.  The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act contains an express 
provision requiring pre-emption.  15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994).  The full text of this section is as 
follows: 
(a) Additional statements 
14
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district court found that only the tombstone advertising provision was 
preempted.85  Furthermore, the court expressly refused to address any 
potential speech-related issues, stating that it intended “no intimation 
whatsoever concerning the First Amendment issues presented in [the] 
case.”86 
2.  District Court — Second Ruling (The First Amendment) 
After an unfavorable decision on preemption grounds, the Tobacco 
Companies returned, seeking a declaration that the regulations were 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.87  This time, the Tobacco 
Companies were joined by several cigar manufacturers (hereinafter 
“Cigar Companies”) who also sought to have the regulations declared 
unconstitutional.88  The court first examined the regulations as they 
applied to the Tobacco Companies.89  Before beginning its analysis, the 
court held that Central Hudson was the appropriate standard of review.90 
                                                                                                                                 
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 
1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package. 
(b) State regulations 
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State 
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which 
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter. 
15 U.S.C § 1334. 
 85. Lorillard, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 133.  The court stated it was pre-empted because it prevented 
“the Tobacco Companies from making a statement concerning the relationship between smoking 
and health.”  Id.  See generally Lee Gordon Dunst, Federal Preemption: The Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act and Tort Claims Challenging the Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings, 
1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 459 (1991) (discussing the problem of preemption as it relates to cigarette 
advertising); Harold C. Reeder, Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department: Cipollone 
Revisited, Billboards, State Law Tort Damages Actions, Federal Preemption and the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 24 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 763 (2001) (discussing the doctrine 
of preemption and examining case law on the issue of preemption and cigarette advertising). 
 86. Lorillard, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 134. 
 87. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 84 F. Supp. 2d 180, 182 (D. Mass. 2000), reversed in 
part by Consolidated Cigar Co. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000), reversed in Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 88. The cigar manufacturers were: Consolidated Cigar Corporation, General Cigar Company, 
Havatampa, John Middleton, L.J. Peretti Company, Swedish Match North America, Swisher 
International, and Tobacco Exporters International (NSA), Ltd.  Id. at 180. 
 89. Id. at 183. 
 90. Id. at 185.  The district court dismissed the Tobacco Companies request for a heightened 
standard of review.  Id.  The Tobacco Companies felt that their case was analogous to the advertiser 
in Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).  Id. at 184.  In Carey, the Supreme Court 
held it was unconstitutional for the state of New York to prohibit the advertisement of 
contraceptives.  431 U.S. at 700.  The Court found heightened scrutiny must be applied when a 
fundamental interest is involved.  See id. at 688.  Furthermore, the Court found that a state could 
only surpass this heightened scrutiny by showing a “compelling” state interest, advanced by a 
narrowly drawn regulation.  Id.  In Lorillard, the district court stated that the Tobacco Companies 
15
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The court reasoned the first prong of Central Hudson was satisfied; 
the advertising qualified for protection because it did not incite illegal 
activity.91  It also decided that the asserted government interest — 
preventing underage smoking — was substantial, thus meeting the 
second prong of the test.92  The court also found the third prong of the 
test was met because the regulations directly advanced the government 
interest.93  Finally, the court determined all of the regulations passed the 
                                                                                                                                 
“closest companions are pornographers” because both offer services, which although legal, are 
recreational and not “fundamental.”  84 F. Supp. 2d at 184.  The court also distinguished Carey on 
the ground that the regulations in Carey sought a complete ban of all advertising, an activity the 
state could not regulate.  Id.  According to the Court, the regulations at issue in Lorillard concerned 
“place and manner” only.  Id. at 185.  Although the court did acknowledge that under a different set 
of circumstances, such as a complete ban on advertising, the heightened scrutiny of Carey could be 
invoked.  Id.  Moreover, the court noted “[s]moking presents no . . . underlying constitutional 
concerns.”  Id. 
 91. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 185-86.  The Attorney General was willing to pass on this 
point, and not argue that cigarette advertising induced illegal activity.  Id. 
 92. Id. at 186.  The court also agreed with the Attorney General’s citation to Penn Advert. of 
Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), where the 
Fourth Circuit “found that promoting compliance with the state prohibition of the sale of cigarettes 
to minors was a substantial governmental interest under Central Hudson.”  Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d 
at 186.  It did not agree with the Tobacco Companies’ attempt to show no substantial governmental 
interest by citing to 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, because that case dealt with a state ban on 
liquor price advertising.  Id. at 186.  The court distinguished 44 Liquormart on the grounds it 
attempted to impose a “vice” characterization on an activity with respect to adult consumers, 
whereas the Massachusetts regulations attempted only to prevent an illegal activity — underage 
smoking.  Id. 
 93. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 187.  The court acknowledged that no governmental interest 
can justify legislation that does not directly advance its interest.  Id. at 186.  However, the District 
Court stated “[t]his requirement may be satisfied by the submission of surveys, studies, and even 
anecdotal evidence.”  Id.  (citing Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 627-29 (1995)).  
Furthermore, the court stated such things as history and common sense could support the a finding 
that the regulation advances the asserted interest.  Id. (quoting Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 
U.S. at 628).  Here, the Attorney General cited cases that showed a “common-sense” connection 
between advertising and smoking, and he cited reports showing that link.  Id. at 186-87.  The court 
discounted the Tobacco Companies’ assertion that the Attorney General’s evidence was insufficient.  
Id. at 187-89.  The Tobacco Companies argued the Attorney General’s evidence did not satisfy 
Central Hudson because it relied too much on common sense.  Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 188.  
The court dismissed this argument, stating “[s]everal studies, and common sense, show a link 
between advertising and smoking.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The Tobacco Companies challenged the 
accuracy and conclusions of the studies the Attorney General cited.  Id.  They argued that there was 
no evidence advertising was the “sole cause” of adolescent tobacco use and they argued there was 
no “conclusive proof” advertising causes people to start smoking.  Id.  The court found there was a 
“solid body of research demonstrating the link between advertising and the incidence of smoking” 
to support the Attorney General’s position.  Id.  Furthermore, the court noted “[t]he government is 
not “required to satisfy the causal relationship by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id.  Rather, it 
stated the government only had to prove the evidence made it “objectively reasonable” to believe 
that the asserted regulation would advance its goal.  Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (citations 
omitted). 
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fourth prong of Central Hudson, with the exception of the point-of-sale 
regulations, because those were not narrowly tailored.94 
The Cigar Companies also challenged the regulations requiring 
additional warning labels95 and restricting certain retail sales practices.96  
The only difference between the Cigar Companies’ arguments and 
Tobacco Companies’ arguments was the Cigar Companies’ argument 
that the First Amendment analysis should be different for cigars.97  In 
addressing these arguments, the court focused only on the last two 
prongs of  Central Hudson.98  It looked at whether the regulations 
directly served the asserted government interest, and whether the 
regulations were more extensive than necessary.99 
In determining whether the regulations advanced the governmental 
interest, the court noted that the Attorney General could not regulate 
cigars in the same manner as cigarettes, unless he could show “how 
regulation of [a] distinguishable product also materially advances the 
governmental interest.”100  Ultimately, the court held the regulation of 
cigars did directly advance the government’s interest.101  However, the 
                                                                                                                                 
 94. Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 193.  On this point, the court found that the Attorney General 
had failed to show the regulation was narrowly tailored “because its sole justification for the 
selection of a [one thousand] foot zone relates to conclusions by a federal agency concerning 
outdoor advertising.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Noting it is not the position of the judiciary to 
choose the proper number, the court held the Attorney General could not prove the one thousand 
foot zone was narrowly tailored for indoor advertising purposes by relying on administrative 
conclusions that picked that number for outdoor advertising purposes.  Id. at 192-93. 
 95. Id. at 193.  The warnings were to inform consumers about the heath risks associated with 
cigar smoking, that cigars are addictive, and that cigars are not a safe alternative to cigarette 
smoking.  Id. 
 96. Id. at 195.  The Cigar Companies argued the restriction on the physical locations of cigars 
in retail stores and the restrictions on promotions and sampling also violated the First Amendment.  
Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 195-96.  The court dismissed these arguments by stating “[t]hese 
concerns are not properly examined under a First Amendment analysis because they do not 
implicate speech or expression.”  Id. at 195.  The court stated the fact that consumers like to handle 
cigars is not a First Amendment issue.  Id.  The court found this to be a “characteristic of the 
commodity” and not an indication of protected expression.  Id.  The court also noted that if the 
restrictions against promotional giveaways and samplings were prevented, then every commercial 
transaction in the country would be implicated “because any sale or giveaway of a product 
inherently conveys information about [the] product itself.”  Id. 
 97. Id. at 193.  Mainly, the Cigar Companies argued cigars are different because: (1) cigar 
manufacturers advertise relatively little compared to cigarette manufacturers, (2) the Food and Drug 
Administration does not include cigars in its regulations because the evidence does not show that 
minors smoke cigars, (3) cigar manufacturers do not advertise by billboard and they do not advertise 
a lot in magazines or newspapers, and (4) consumers like to feel, smell, and look at cigars before 
they purchase them.  Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 193-94. 
 98. Id. at 194. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 195.  The court stated that the Attorney General had proved cigarettes and cigars 
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court found the evidence insufficient to justify the point-of-sale 
restriction and the restriction on retail sales practices.102  As to the 
challenge on the additional warning label requirement, the court found 
that it was constitutional because it advanced the state’s interest and was 
narrowly tailored.103 
3.  The Appeal 
On appeal, both the Tobacco Companies and the Cigar Companies 
advanced the same arguments presented to the lower court.104  The First 
Circuit affirmed the district court on the preemption issue.105  On the 
First Amendment issue, the circuit court also agreed that Central 
Hudson was the appropriate test.106  The court then followed the Central 
Hudson analysis, much like the lower court.107  However, it ultimately 
                                                                                                                                 
had many similarities.  Id.  Furthermore, the court stated the “Attorney General should not have to 
wait until there is a new epidemic of underage cigar smokers in order to enact regulations intended 
to prevent that very epidemic.”  Lorillard, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 195. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 198.  The court found the third prong of Central Hudson was “easy to satisfy in the 
context of product warnings.”  Id. at 197 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)).  As to the 
fourth prong of Central Hudson, the court found the requirement narrowly tailored and dismissed 
the Cigar Companies’ argument that the warning labels were burdensome.  Id. at 198. 
 104. Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2000) (per curiam), reversed 
in part by Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).  The Attorney General cross-
appealed the district court’s decision regarding the indoor advertising restriction.  Id. 
 105. Id. at 41. 
 106. Id. at 42.  “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that even regulations which single out the 
promotional speech of a particular industry are analyzed under the Central Hudson test.”  Id. (citing 
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)).  The court also 
rejected the argument that the regulations constitute viewpoint discrimination.  Id.  “Under these 
circumstances, we do not see the danger of viewpoint discrimination . . . and we decline to impose a 
higher level of review on such basis.”  Id.  But see Tommy Sangchompuphen, Stripping United 
States v. Playboy Entm’t Group Down to the Bare Essential: Why Keeping Abreast of First 
Amendment Issues in Developing Technology Requires Predictability and a Return to Strict 
Scrutiny, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 81 (1999) (arguing strict scrutiny is needed to uphold First 
Amendment safeguards in cases where the regulations are content-based). 
 107. The court assumed, but did not explore the first prong of the test — whether the speech 
concerns lawful activity.  Consolidated, 218. F.3d at 43.  Concerning the second prong, the court 
found the state’s interest was substantial.  Id. at 44.  The court dismissed the argument made by the 
Tobacco and Cigar Companies that “Massachusetts cannot have a substantial interest in depriving 
consumers of truthful information in a paternalistic effort to protect them by ‘keeping them in the 
dark.’”  Id.  The court agreed with the statement as it related to adults, but stated the government has 
greater power when it comes to children.  Id.  With regard to the third prong, the court found the 
Massachusetts regulations directly advanced the state’s interest.  Id.  Looking to the Supreme Court 
for guidance, the circuit court analyzed whether the regulations addressed “real” harms and 
alleviated them to a “material” degree.  Id. (citing Greater New Orleans Broad., 527 U.S. at 188).  
The court felt the Attorney General established there is a risk of harm from underage tobacco use, 
including cigars and smokeless tobacco.  Consolidated, 218 F.3d at 45.  The court also felt the 
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reversed the district court, finding that all of the restrictions were 
narrowly tailored.108  The court summarily dismissed all of the other 
First Amendment arguments the parties presented.109  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to hear arguments on both issues.110 
C.  United States Supreme Court Decision 
1.  The Majority Opinion 
The regulations before the Supreme Court were the outdoor 
advertising and point-of-sale advertising restrictions.111  The Cigar 
Companies also challenged the regulation that made it unlawful to have 
samplings and promotional giveaways, and unlawful to have self-service 
displays within the reach of the consumer.112  The Court first considered 
the preemption issue and reversed the First Circuit.113  It held that the 
regulations were preempted because “Congress prohibited state cigarette 
advertising regulations that were motivated by concerns about smoking 
and health.”114  However, despite finding that the regulations were 
preempted, the Court still had to decide the First Amendment issues.115 
                                                                                                                                 
Attorney General’s “common sense argument on the causal relationship between advertising and 
product use” carried the burden of proving that the Massachusetts regulations would alleviate the 
“harm” to a “material degree.”  Id. at 47-48.  The court summarized its analysis of the third prong of 
Central Hudson, stating “[l]ess advertising may reasonably be expected to reduce the consumption 
of tobacco products by current users, insofar as there will be fewer reminders to stop at the store and 
pick up a pack of cigarettes, a can of smokeless tobacco, or a cigar. . . .”  Id. at 49. 
 108. The Circuit Court stated the one thousand foot regulation did not need to be a “perfect 
fit.”  Id. at 50.  According to the court, Central Hudson only requires a “reasonable fit.”  Id. 
 109. Id. at 51-53.  Namely, both the Tobacco Companies and the Cigar Companies argued 
Massachusetts should more strictly enforce its current laws prohibiting tobacco sales to minors, that 
the regulations did not leave open ample alternative modes of communication, and that the 
regulations were not sufficiently tailored.  Consolidated, 218 F.3d at 51-53.  The Cigar Companies 
and manufacturers of smokeless tobacco also argued the restrictions on self-service displays 
violated the First Amendment.  Id.  However, the circuit court found this was not “speech” within 
the meaning of the First Amendment.  Id.  The court declined to answer whether the sale of high-
end cigars was protected commercial speech finding that “the regulations pass muster under Central 
Hudson even assuming arguendo that the commercial speech analysis applies.”  Id. at 54 (emphasis 
in original).  With respect to the warning requirement for cigars, the court affirmed the district court 
for “substantially” the same reasons.  Id. 
 110. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 531 U.S. 1068 (2001) (order granting certiorari to hear 
the issues); Altadis U.S.A. Inc. v. Reilly, 531 U.S. 1068 (2001) (order granting certiorari to hear the 
issues). 
 111. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 534 (2001). 
 112. Id. at 535. 
 113. Id. at 551. 
 114. Id. at 548 (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. at 533.  This is because the FCLAA’s pre-emption provision only applies to cigarettes, 
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Consistent with both lower courts, the Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that strict scrutiny should apply.116  The Court quickly 
dispensed with the first two prongs of Central Hudson, and found that 
only the third and fourth prongs were at issue.117  It then addressed 
whether the outdoor advertising and point-of-sale restrictions for 
smokeless tobacco and cigars directly advanced the government interest, 
and whether they were narrowly tailored.118 
The Court found that the Attorney General satisfied the third prong 
of Central Hudson for the outdoor advertising restrictions by relying on 
its previous cases,119 and on the Attorney General’s citations to studies 
supporting the correlation between advertising and tobacco use.120  The 
Court reasoned that the evidence proved the regulations were based on 
more than just “mere speculation and conjecture.”121  However, the 
Court still determined that the Attorney General failed to satisfy the 
fourth prong of Central Hudson.122  The Court stated the regulations 
were not a “reasonable fit between the means and the ends of the 
regulatory scheme.”123 Moreover, it ascertained that the regulations were 
                                                                                                                                 
not cigars or smokeless tobacco.  Id.  The Court was also forced to examine the First Amendment 
issues for the Tobacco Companies because they did not raise the issue of pre-emption for the 
restrictions on sales practices.  Id. 
 116. Id. at 554-55.  (“[W]e see no need to break new ground. . . .  Central Hudson, as applied 
in our more recent cases, provides an adequate basis for decision”) (citing Greater New Orleans 
Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)).  But see Clara Sue Ross, Comment, 
Pushing Puffing Post-Posadas, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1461 (1988) (arguing that even if Central 
Hudson continues to be the standard it should be strictly applied). 
 117. Lorillard, 533 U.S at 555.  As to the first two prongs, the Court noted that the parties 
agreed the speech was entitled to First Amendment protection, and the government had a substantial 
interest in preventing minors from using tobacco.  Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. The Court stated “[i]n previous cases we have acknowledged the theory that product 
advertising stimulates the demand for products, while suppressed advertising may have the opposite 
effect.”  Id. at 557 (citations omitted). 
 120. Id.  The Court relied in large part on the FDA’s findings, which consisted of various 
studies that showcased the affects of tobacco advertising on children.  Id. at 557-59.  Although the 
Court acknowledged the evidence showing the correlation between advertising and the use of cigars 
by children was lacking, it found that the third prong of Central Hudson was satisfied by other 
indications that cigar use by minors was increasing and that there was a link between cigar 
advertising and demand.  Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 560. 
 121. Id. at 561 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 
(1980)).  The main reason was that the regulations, in some areas, would constitute almost complete 
ban of tobacco advertising.  Id. at 562.  The Court found “[t]he breadth and scope of the regulations, 
and the process by which the Attorney General adopted the [Massachusetts] regulations, do not 
demonstrate a careful calculation of the speech interests involved.”  Id.  At the heart of this 
statement was the fact the one thousand foot restriction was inappropriate for every area.  See 
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562-63.  According to the Court, the effect of such a regulation will vary 
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more extensive than necessary to accomplish the stated goals.124  The 
Court next examined the point-of-sale regulations and held that the 
Attorney General had failed to satisfy both the third and fourth prongs of 
Central Hudson.125 
Next, the Court addressed the retail sales practices as they applied 
to all tobacco products.126  Namely, the Court addressed those 
regulations that banned self-service displays and those that required 
tobacco products to be placed out of the consumer’s reach.127  The Court 
upheld all of these restrictions, reasoning that they withstood First 
Amendment scrutiny because the state’s interest was “unrelated to the 
communication of ideas.”128  Overall, the Court affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
its decision.129 
                                                                                                                                 
depending on the locale, and it should be tailored for that reason.  See id. at 563.  The Court also 
found the “range of communications” was too broad.  Id.  The Court pointed to the portion of the 
regulations that banned oral communications and found that it was not clear why such a ban would 
be necessary.  Id.  The Court also found the regulations restricting the size of signs were overbroad.  
Id.  As to these overbroad regulations, the Court noted the circuit court had “failed to follow through 
with an analysis of the countervailing First Amendment interests.”  Id. at 564.  It placed a great deal 
of emphasis on the rights of the tobacco retailers and manufacturers in conveying information about 
their product to adults, and the corresponding rights of adults to receive that information.  Lorillard, 
533 U.S. at 564. 
 124. Id. at 565.  The Court stated “a speech regulation cannot unduly impinge on the speaker’s 
ability to propose a commercial transaction and the adult listener’s opportunity to obtain 
information about products.”  Id. 
 125. Id. at 566.  The Court found the regulation did not support the government’s stated 
purpose to the degree required by Central Hudson.  Id.  Citing Central Hudson, the Court stated that 
a regulation must fail if it offers only “ineffective or remote support” for the government’s stated 
purpose.  Id.  The Court also noted: 
[T]he State’s goal is to prevent minors from using tobacco products and to curb demand 
for that activity by limiting youth exposure to advertising.  The [five] foot rule does not 
seem to advance that goal.  Not all children are less than five feet tall, and those who are 
certainly have the ability to look up and take in their surroundings. 
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566.  The Court recognized the Attorney General may well have a valid 
interest in preventing “displays that entice children,” but that a “blanket height restriction does not 
constitute a reasonable fit with that goal.”  Id. at 567. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 569 (citation omitted).  The Court further stated “[t]he means chosen by the State 
are narrowly tailored to prevent access to tobacco products by minors, are unrelated to expression, 
and leave open alternative means for vendors to convey information about their products and for 
would-be customers to inspect products before purchase.”  Id. at 570. 
 129. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 571. 
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2.  Justice Thomas’ Concurring Opinion130 
Justice Thomas concurred in the majority opinion because he 
agreed with the resolution of the preemption issue and that the 
regulations failed Central Hudson.131  However, he disagreed with the 
Majority’s application of the commercial speech doctrine to the 
Massachusetts regulations.132  Not only did Justice Thomas feel the 
regulations were incorrectly classified as commercial speech,133 but also 
that the regulations were more than “time, place and manner” 
restrictions.134  Relying heavily on his concurring opinion in 44 
                                                                                                                                 
 130. Several other justices filed separate opinions.  Id. at 571-605.  First, Justice Kennedy, 
joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.  Id. at 571.  Justice 
Kennedy felt the outdoor advertising restrictions were overbroad enough to invalidate them on that 
ground alone.  Id.  As a result, he felt there was no need to analyze the regulations under the third 
prong of Central Hudson.  Id.  Moreover, he expressed doubt over the Court’s affirming Central 
Hudson as the appropriate level of scrutiny in light of the objections made by Justice Thomas.  Id.  
Justice Souter concurred in part and dissented in part.  Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 590.  He felt the case 
should be remanded for trial regarding the constitutionality of the one thousand foot restriction.  Id.  
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and joined in part by Justice Souter, 
dissented.  Id. at 591.  They found that the FCLAA does not prevent states from regulating the 
location of advertising.  Id.  Justice Stevens felt the decision should be vacated as to the outdoor-
advertising restrictions because the record “[did] not enable [the Court] to adjudicate the merits of 
those claims on summary judgment.”  Id.  As to the point-of-sale restrictions, Justice Stevens would 
have upheld them, finding no significant First Amendment concerns.  Id. 
 131. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 572. 
 132. Id.  According to Justice Thomas, “when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech 
in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in 
question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’”  Id. (citation omitted).  But see Ralph W. Johnson, 
III, Comment, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board: 
The Demise of New York’s Son of Sam Law and the Decision that Could Have Been, 2 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 193, *4 (1992) (arguing the overuse of strict scrutiny will dilute 
it and make it less effective). Johnson states: 
[R]eliance [on strict scrutiny] creates the possibility that the protection of strict scrutiny 
will be “diluted.”  The notion of content-based regulations can be more precisely divided 
into subject-matter restrictions and viewpoint-based discriminations.  It is the latter that 
is the most consistent with the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment and 
therefore requires the most stringent review. 
Id. at *16 (citation omitted). 
 133. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574.  Justice Thomas briefly outlines the commercial speech 
doctrine and notes the Court has “followed an uncertain course” in its application of the doctrine, 
due in large part to the “malleability” of the Central Hudson test.  Id.  Observing that there is no 
“philosophical or historical” basis for lowering the scrutiny for commercial speech, Justice Thomas 
expresses doubt over “whether it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial speech.”  Id. at 575 (citing Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s 
Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990)). 
 134. Id. at 573.  Acknowledging that the Court has previously upheld time, place and manner 
restrictions as zoning restrictions, Justice Thomas states the “abiding characteristic of valid time, 
place, and manner restrictions is their content neutrality.”  Id.  The Massachusetts regulations, 
Justice Thomas notes, are not concerned with “secondary effects,” but rather, with the primary 
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Liquormart v. Rhode Island,135 Justice Thomas argued that the 
Massachusetts regulations sought “to suppress speech about tobacco 
because [the government] object[ed] to the content of [the] speech.”136 
Justice Thomas contended that because the Court had “consistently 
applied strict scrutiny” to content-based regulations, it should have done 
so in Lorillard.137  Furthermore, he stated the asserted governmental 
interest was “per se” illegitimate because the regulations sought to keep 
“people ignorant by suppressing expression.”138  Justice Thomas stated 
that even if the commercial speech doctrine was applicable, “the 
government may not engage in content discrimination for reasons 
unrelated to those characteristics of the speech that place it within [that] 
category.”139  According to Justice Thomas, the commercial speech 
doctrine should be limited to those regulations that address the 
“commercial harms that commercial speech can threaten.”140 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Regulations Aimed at Keeping the Public Ignorant Deserve Strict 
Judicial Scrutiny 
Justice Thomas is correct in concluding that content-based 
regulations should not be analyzed under Central Hudson.141  Certain 
regulations, such as the Massachusetts regulations in Lorillard, are 
                                                                                                                                 
effect of inducing those who view the tobacco advertisements to purchase the products.  Id. at 574.  
See supra note 16 (noting the use of the term “content-based” in this Note refers to those regulations 
that are normally subjected to strict scrutiny in order to protect First Amendment guarantees). 
 135. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas J., concurring in 
part, and concurring in the judgement) (arguing Central Hudson does not apply where the 
regulations are per se illegitimate). 
 136. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574. 
 137. Id. at 574. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994)). 
 138. Id. (quoting 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and concurring 
in judgment)).  Moreover, Justice Thomas stated content-based discrimination cannot be analyzed 
under reduced scrutiny merely because it can be labeled commercial speech.  See id. at 576. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 576 (emphasis in original).  An example would be regulations that 
address the risks of deceptive and misleading advertising — not those that regulate the content.  Id.  
According to Thomas, “[w]hatever power the State may have to regulate commercial speech, it may 
not use that power to limit the content of commercial speech . . . . Such content-discriminatory 
regulation — like all other content-based regulation of speech — must be subjected to strict 
scrutiny.”  Id. at 577. 
 141. But see Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554-55.  Generally, “[r]egulations which permit the 
Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the 
First Amendment.”  Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) (citation omitted). 
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content-based regardless of their somewhat commercial nature.142  
Moreover, the aim of such regulations is to keep people ingnorant of 
ideas that are considered harmful or socially inappropriate by preventing 
access to such information.143  Because of the potential to keep people 
ignorant, several justices have opined that Central Hudson is not always 
the appropriate test to apply.144  However, the Court has yet to move 
away from Central Hudson and apply strict scrutiny to regulations of a 
“commercial nature.”145  Nevertheless, the Court needs to recognize that 
strict scrutiny is the appropriate test when the government seeks to 
regulate the content of speech.146 
1.  Content-Based Regulations Must Pass Strict Scrutiny 
The Massachusetts regulations in Lorillard are content-based 
because they seek to prohibit access to information about tobacco.147  If 
a regulation is content-based, it is presumed unconstitutional and subject 
                                                                                                                                 
 142. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement). 
 143. Id. at 575.  Cf.  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (discussing First 
Amendment protection of all ideas).  According to the Court in Roth: 
  The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people . . . . 
. . . 
  All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance – unorthodox ideas, 
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion – have the full 
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited 
area of more important interests. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 144. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554. (citations omitted).  According to the Lorillard Court, 
“[s]everal Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and 
whether it should apply in particular cases.”  Id. (citations omitted).  However, the Lorillard Court 
found no “need to break new ground.”  Id. 
 145. See id.  The Court, looking at its recent commercial speech cases, found that the Central 
Hudson test is “adequate.”  Id. at 555 (citing Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)). 
 146. It is important to note “that the government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on 
speech raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from 
the marketplace.”  Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 116 (1991).  According to the Supreme Court: 
The constitutional right of free expression is . . . intended to remove governmental 
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall 
be voiced largely into the hands of each of us . . . in the belief that no other approach 
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice . . . . 
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 
(1971)). 
 147. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 574. (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement).  
According to Justice Thomas, the regulations are content-based because they seek “to suppress 
speech about tobacco because [the government] objects to the content of that speech.”  Id. 
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to strict scrutiny.148  The Lorillard Court should have made a 
determination as to whether or not the regulations were content-based.149  
Apparently, the Court felt because there was a commercial nature to the 
speech, it was unnecessary to consider a content-based analysis.150  
However, by comparing Lorillard to other content-based regulations, it 
becomes clear the Massachusetts regulations were content-based and 
that strict scrutiny should have been applied.151 
a.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism 
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Court was forced to decide 
whether a municipal noise regulation was facially invalid.152  Because 
content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions are subject to a lower 
                                                                                                                                 
 148. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
 149. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 555.  The threshold question that needs to be asked is whether a 
regulation is content-based.  Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 883, 910 (1991).  Galloway argues: 
Content-based infringements fall into several categories.  First, infringements directed at 
[a] claimant’s point of view are content-based.  Second, infringements directed at the 
subject matter of the communication are content-based.  Third, infringements directed at 
[a] claimant’s choice of words are content-based.  Fourth, infringements directed at [a] 
claimant’s identity are content-based.  Fifth, infringements directed at the 
“communicative impact” of [a] claimant’s conduct are content-based. 
Id. (citations omitted) The Massachusetts regulations are content-based because they are directed at 
both the subject matter (tobacco) and the communicative impact of the speech (youth smoking).  
See 940 CMR §§ 21.01 – 22.09 (2002). 
 150. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554.  The Lorillard Court merely quoted Central Hudson for the 
proposition that there is a “distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which 
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulations, and other varieties of speech.”  Id. 
(quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562).  The Court performed no analysis to determine whether 
the regulations were content-based, other than stating that Central Hudson was the appropriate test.  
See id. 
 151. See infra notes 152-184 and accompanying text. 
 152. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989).  In Ward, the city of New York 
enacted a municipal ordinance, which required those who performed in the bandshell, an 
amphitheater in Central Park, to use certain city furnished equipment and personnel designed to 
minimize the volume of amplified music.  Id. at 787.  Respondent, Rock Against Racism, had put 
on concerts in the bandshell in the years prior to the enactment of the ordinance.  Id. at 784.  
However, it filed suit when it learned that its upcoming concert would be subject to the new 
ordinance.  Id. at 787.  The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an 
injunction, which permitted the Respondent to use its own sound equipment instead of the city’s.  
Id.  After the concert, Respondent sought to have the ordinance struck down as facially invalid.  Id. 
at 788.  The district court upheld the guidelines allowing the city to require use of it’s own 
equipment.  Id.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that content-neutral 
regulations are permissible as long as the regulation is reasonable.  Id.  at 789.  The appellate court 
also found that the regulation must be as least restrictive as possible, but found that in this case the 
city did not use the least restrictive means.  Id.  The Supreme Court reversed, finding the ordinance 
was valid on its face and that the appellate court erred by requiring the city prove that the regulation 
was the least restrictive means. Id. at 789-90. 
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level of judicial scrutiny,153 the Court initially inquired as to whether the 
regulations were content-based.154  First, the Court noted the controlling 
consideration in making this determination is the government’s 
purpose.155  Second, it noted the regulation must be “justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech.”156  The Ward Court, in 
applying this two-part test, found that the ordinance at issue was not 
content-based.157  However, the respondent’s First Amendment rights 
were sufficiently protected because the Court made a content-based 
determination before choosing which level of judicial scrutiny to 
apply.158 
In Lorillard, the government’s purpose in enacting the regulations 
was to keep “people ignorant by suppressing expression. . . .”159 The 
regulations were created to keep minors from viewing tobacco 
advertising, in order to further the primary purpose of preventing 
underage smoking.160  However, the regulations are not “justified” 
without reference to the content of the speech because they are 
specifically limited to tobacco.161  Accordingly, if the Lorillard Court 
                                                                                                                                 
 153. See supra note 32 (discussing the level of judicial scrutiny afforded to content-neutral 
regulations). 
 154. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.  According to the Court, “[t]he principal inquiry in determining 
content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is 
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys.”  Id. (citing Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
295 (1984)). 
 155. Id.  “A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed 
neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages, but not others.”  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
 156. Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
 157. Ward, 491 U.S. at 792.  According to the Court, the government’s purpose was to: (1) 
control noise, and to (2) “avoid undue intrusion into residential areas and other areas of the park.”  
Id.  The Court noted the regulations had nothing to do with the content of the speech.  Id. 
 158. But see, Johnson, supra note 132, at *18 (arguing there is a danger of diluting the 
protection strict scrutiny affords when the Court applies it to anything other than viewpoint 
discrimination).  According to Johnson, the Court does great detriment to the First Amendment 
when it protects regulations that are merely content-based subject matter restrictions.  Id.  Moreover, 
Johnson argues that the Massachusetts regulations would not be deserving of strict scrutiny because 
the regulations do not deal with political speech.  See id. at *19.  Cf.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (noting nothing less than strict scrutiny is appropriate when state law 
burdens “core political speech”). 
 159. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J. concurring in part, 
concurring in judgement). 
 160. Id. at 533.  The Massachusetts Attorney General explicitly stated the purpose of the 
regulations was to prevent the Tobacco Companies from recruiting new customers.  Id. 
 161. See 940 CMR §§ 21.01 –  22.09 (2002).  But see Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 
512 U.S. 753, 762 (1994) (finding an injunction restricting only the speech of anti-abortion 
protestors was not content-based).  In Madsen, the petitioners argued that an injunction specifically 
directed at anti-abortion protests was content-based.  Id.  However, the Court found “[t]o accept 
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would have gone through a content-based determination, it would likely 
have found that the Massachusetts regulations failed the test set forth in 
Ward.162 
b.  Boos v. Barry 
In Boos v. Barry, the Court analyzed whether a statute prohibiting 
the display of signs in front of a foreign embassy violated the First 
Amendment.163  Appropriately, the Court first made a determination as 
to whether the statute was content-based or content-neutral.164  In 
making this determination, the Court looked at exactly what type of 
speech the government was attempting to prohibit.165  The Court began 
by noting that the First Amendment is hostile “to [the] prohibition of 
public discussion of an entire topic.”166  The Court ultimately found the 
statute was not content-neutral because it was not concerned with the 
secondary effects of the prohibited speech.167  In discussing secondary 
                                                                                                                                 
petitioners’ claim would be to classify virtually every injunction as content or viewpoint based.  An 
injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group . . . . and perhaps the speech, of that 
particular group.”  Id.  However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia found the ordinance did 
violate the First Amendment.  Id. at 785.  According to Justice Scalia, regulations that deny exercise 
of free speech and apply only to “a particular group, which had broken no law, [and] to that group 
and that group alone, are profoundly at odds with our First Amendment. . . .” Id. 
 162. See supra notes 152-161 and accompanying text.  According to the Supreme Court, 
“government regulation of speech must be measured in minimums, not maximums.”  See Riley v. 
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 790 (1988) (applying strict scrutiny to a North 
Carolina statute that regulated charities).  If this is true, then it stands to reason the Court should 
start its analysis with a determination as to whether the regulations are content-based and work its 
way down.  See id. 
 163. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988).  In Boos, the petitioners wanted to place signs in 
front of foreign embassies.  Id. at 315.  They also wanted to be able to congregate within 500 feet of 
the embassies.  Id.  However, the statute at issue prevented both of these activities.  Id.  The 
petitioners brought an action challenging the statute as facially unconstitutional.  Id. at 316. The 
district court granted the respondent’s motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court 
affirmed.  Id. 
 164. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318.  However, before deciding whether the speech was content-based, 
the Court did note the speech at issue was political speech and was worthy of the most 
Constitutional protection.  See id. 
 165. Id. at 318-19.  In Boos, the Court found the government was attempting to prohibit only 
speech that was critical of a foreign government.  Id. 
 166. Id. at 319 (citation omitted). 
 167. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.  The respondents in this case argued the statute should be upheld as 
a content-neutral regulation of time, place, and manner.  Id.  They argued that the statute was 
concerned with the secondary effects of the speech, which was protecting foreign diplomats “from 
speech that offends their dignity.”  Id. at 320.  The Court, however, decided the statute was not 
concerned with secondary effects because concern about secondary effects applies “to regulations 
that apply to a particular category of speech because the regulatory targets happen to be associated 
with that type of speech.”  Id.  (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)). 
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effects, the Court stated “[r]egulations that focus on the direct impact of 
the speech on its audience present a different situation.”168  Moreover, 
the Court held that restrictions aimed at regulating a person’s reactions 
to speech are not valid because a person’s reaction to speech is not a 
type of secondary effect.169 
The Boos Court’s reasoning, applied to Lorillard, demonstrates that 
the Massachusetts regulations are content-based and should have been 
subject to strict scrutiny.170  First, the Massachusetts regulations are 
aimed at preventing smoking.171  Second, they prohibit an entire 
category of speech — tobacco.172  The regulations are not concerned 
with secondary effects, but with the primary effect of discouraging 
smoking.173  Moreover, the regulations are aimed at regulating a 
person’s reactions to advertising.174  According to the Court’s decision in 
Boos, such regulations are not content-based.175  Yet, the Lorillard Court 
did not adopt this reasoning, presumably only because the speech was 
commercial in nature.176 
c.  Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC 
In Turner, the Court decided that the constitutionality of the Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act’s “must carry” 
                                                                                                                                 
 168. Id. at 321. 
 169. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.  The Court made a comparison to its decision in Renton.  Id.  In 
Renton, a zoning ordinance was enacted that prohibited any adult movie theaters from locating 
within one thousand feet of any residential area, church, park, or school.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 43.  
The Renton Court found the ordinance was a content-neutral regulation of time, place, and manner.  
Id. at 49.  The Court noted the regulation did “not appear to fit neatly into either the ‘content-based’ 
or the ‘content-neutral’ category.”  Id. at 47.  However, because the regulation was not concerned so 
much with the content of the films, but with the “undesirable secondary effects,” the Court 
appropriately applied an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny.  See id. at 49. 
 170. But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (noting the First Amendment’s 
protections are strongest with regard to political speech). 
 171. Cf. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318 (finding regulations preventing the criticism of foreign 
governments are content-based). 
 172. Cf. Boos, 485 U.S. at 319 (noting regulations aimed a preventing an entire category of 
speech are not permitted). 
 173. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574 (2001) (Thomas, J. concurring in part, 
concurring in judgement).  “Massachusetts is not concerned with any ‘secondary effects’ of tobacco 
advertising — it is concerned with the advertising’s primary effect, which is to induce those who 
view the advertisements to purchase and use tobacco products.”  Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. 
 176. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 575 (Thomas, J. concurring in part, concurring in judgement).  “It 
should be clear that if these regulations targeted anything other than advertising for commercial 
products — if, for example, they were directed at billboards promoting political candidates — all 
would agree that they restrictions should be subjected to strict scrutiny.”  Id. 
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provisions needed to be decided by “some measure of heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny.”177  Before determining a proper level of judicial 
scrutiny, the Court stated that “[d]eciding whether a particular regulation 
is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”178  The 
Court went back to its opinion in Ward and noted the principal inquiry 
— whether the government seeks to regulate speech because of the 
message it conveys — must be made.179  According to the Court, “[l]aws 
that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on 
the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.”180  The 
Court contrasted content-based regulations with content-neutral 
regulations and noted content-neutral regulations do not reference ideas 
or viewpoints.181 
Again, if the Turner Court’s reasoning is applied to Lorillard, it 
illustrates that the Lorillard Court failed to afford the Tobacco 
Companies the proper measure of First Amendment protection.182  First, 
the Court did not perform the “principal inquiry” to determine whether 
the government was seeking to regulate the speech based on the message 
conveyed.183 In fact, if the Court had made this inquiry, it would have 
                                                                                                                                 
 177. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).  In Turner, the regulations 
required that cable operators “must carry” certain local broadcast stations.  Id. at 630.  The Court 
ultimately held that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate form of “heightened scrutiny.”  Id. at 
643.  According to the Court, “[i]nsofar as they pertain to the carriage of full-power broadcasters, 
the must carry rules, on their face, impose burdens and confer benefits without reference to the 
content of the speech.”  Id.  See generally Symposium, Constitutional Substantial-Evidence 
Review?  Lessons from the Supreme Court’s Turner Broadcasting Decision, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
1162, 1175 (1997) (discussing the Court’s use of intermediate scrutiny in Turner). 
 178. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642. 
 179. Id.  According to the Court, “The purpose, or justification, of a regulation will often be 
evident on its face.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 180. Id. at 643 (citations omitted). 
 181. Id.  The Court stated, “[l]aws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without 
reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral.”  Id.  See generally 
Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight From [the]First Amendment Doctrine: 
Justice Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817 (1998) (discussing 
Justice Breyer’s approach in Turner and its effect on competing First Amendment interests). 
 182. But see Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 954-
55 (1992) (arguing the First Amendment should not prevent government regulation of harmful 
products). According to Law, 
[A] state is free to ban advertising for products producing harmful dependence in a 
substantial proportion of users.  Whether a product is addictive or harmful is an 
empirical question.  Whether advertising for a particular product can be banned depends 
upon the state’s ability to demonstrate that the particular product is harmful and likely to 
produce dependence. 
Id. 
 183. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554-55 (2001) (finding Central Hudson to 
be the appropriate test and refusing to “break new ground” by applying strict scrutiny). 
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found Massachusetts was attempting to regulate speech based on the 
ideas and views that would have been expressed through the Tobacco 
Companies’ advertising.184 
2.  Viewpoint Discrimination Deserves Strict Scrutiny 
At the very least, the Lorillard Court should have found the 
Massachusetts regulations were content-based restrictions and applied 
strict scrutiny.185  However, the regulations arguably constitute 
viewpoint discrimination and could have been found per se 
unconstitutional.186  While the better approach would have been to apply 
strict scrutiny, the Court should not have limited itself to Central 
Hudson when the regulations could have failed for other reasons.187  An 
                                                                                                                                 
 184. Cf. Robinson, supra note 34, at 707 (arguing that the Turner Court failed in its analysis by 
not finding the “must carry” provisions content-based restrictions on the freedom of speech).  
According to Robinson, “[t]he Supreme Court incorrectly held the First Amendment intermediate 
level scrutiny applicable to the must-carry provisions.  The Court should have held that the 
provisions warrant strict scrutiny because they are content-based regulations on speech protected by 
the First Amendment.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 185. But see Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom 
of Speech, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 337 (1997) (arguing there is no distinction between 
content-based regulations and viewpoint-based regulations unless there is a distinction between 
those regulations founded on intolerance and those based on paternalism); Penelope Seator, Judicial 
Indifference to Pornography’s Harm: American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 297, 302 (1987) (arguing laws prohibiting pornography should not be seen as unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination because they are aimed at social harms and not at the underlying idea). 
 186. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (holding a 
university policy regulating the funding of newspapers was unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination).  According to the Supreme Court: 
[T]he state may sometimes curtail speech when necessary to advance a significant and 
legitimate state interest . . . . [However], there are some purported interests – such as a 
desire to suppress support for a minority party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the 
expression of certain points of view from the market place of ideas – that are so plainly 
illegitimate that they would immediately invalidate the rule.  The general principle that 
has emerged . . . is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech 
in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. 
City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). 
 187. But see Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints From Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 697 
(1996) (arguing that allowing content-based restrictions to be classified as viewpoint discrimination 
may have significant impact on First Amendment law).  According to Greenawalt, “[t]he Core of 
the Court’s opinion [in Rosenberger] is unconvincing because it fails to elaborate a plausible 
account of what constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”  Id. at 697.  In his criticism of the 
Rosenberger opinion, he states: 
Taken at face value, the Rosenberger majority . . . . undermines the distinction between 
viewpoint discrimination and most other content distinctions . . . .  [I]f the fact that 
descriptive treatments of a subject matter from a historical or psychological perspective 
are left free by some regulation is sufficient to constitute viewpoint discrimination, then 
there has not yet been (and probably never will be) an instance of content discrimination 
that is not viewpoint discrimination.  Further, any content discrimination is likely to have 
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examination of the Massachusetts regulations as compared to previously 
decided cases dealing with viewpoint discrimination proves the Court 
could have found the regulations per se unconstitutional.188 
a.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 
In R.A.V., the Court considered whether a city ordinance was 
facially invalid under the First Amendment.189  The Court established 
that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it prohibited speech 
based solely on its subject.190  The Court further noted the regulations 
amounted to viewpoint discrimination because they only proscribed hate 
speech on certain topics.191  According to the Court, this was 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.192 
                                                                                                                                 
some indirect effect of helping certain viewpoints in preference to others . . . . No 
restriction on expression (content based or not) will be entirely free of influence on 
acceptance of viewpoint. 
Id. at 707-08. 
 188. But see Harvard Law Review, Viewpoint Discrimination — Funding for Religious 
Publication, 109 HARV. L. REV. 210, 215 (1995) (noting viewpoint discrimination will normally be 
applied to most bans on religious and political speech). 
 189. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).  In R.A.V., the Petitioner was 
charged with violating a provision of the city code, which made it unlawful to place “on public or 
private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited 
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses 
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender . . . .”  Id.  
See generally Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography after R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 873, 874 (1993) (discussing the problems of viewpoint discrimination as they relate to 
R.A.V. and discussing alternative ways for the government to regulate hate speech and 
pornography). 
 190. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.  According to the Court, just because some categories of speech 
are traditionally unprotected, does not mean “that the First Amendment imposes no obstacle 
whatsoever to regulation of particular instances of such proscribable expression, so that the 
government ‘may regulate [them] freely.’”  Id. at 384 (alterations in original). 
 191. Id. at 391.  The R.A.V. Court stated: 
In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content 
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.  Displays containing some words — 
odious racial epithets, for example — would be prohibited to proponents of all views.  
But, “fighting words” that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or 
gender — aspersions upon a person’s mother, for example — would seemingly be usable 
ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and 
equality, but could not be used by those speakers’ opponents.  One could hold up a sign 
saying, for example, that all “anti-Catholic bigots” are misbegotten; but not that all 
“papists” are, for that would insult and provoke violence “on the basis of religion.” 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 192. Id. at 393-94.  But see id. at 415 (Blackmun, J. concurring) (arguing that the effect of the 
Court’s opinion will be to weaken First Amendment protection).  According to Justice Blackmun, 
the problem with the Court’s decision is: (1) if the Court is forbidden to characterize protection, for 
example as fighting words or obscenity, First Amendment protection will be reduced across the 
board, and (2) the case would be regarded as an “aberration,” where the Court manipulated and 
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Applying this same reasoning to Lorillard, it is simple to see how 
the Court could have used viewpoint discrimination as a basis for 
striking down the Massachusetts regulations.193  In Lorillard, the 
regulations prohibit speech based solely on the subject of the speech — 
tobacco.194  Moreover, the regulations prohibit speech by narrowing it to 
a certain topic — adolescents and tobacco.195  For all intents and 
purposes, this was viewpoint discrimination.196  However, it would be 
difficult to support the argument that the Massachusetts regulations 
should be struck down under R.A.V. alone, because R.A.V. did not 
clearly define what constitutes viewpoint discrimination.197  Therefore, it 
is necessary to examine some of the Court’s later cases on this subject.198 
                                                                                                                                 
created a doctrine solely for the purpose of striking down an ordinance “whose premise it opposed.”  
Id. at 416.  Moreover, Justice Blackmun stated, “I see no First Amendment values that are 
compromised by a law that prohibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by 
burning crosses on their lawns, but I see great harm in preventing the people of Saint Paul from 
specifically punishing the race-based fighting words that so prejudice their community.”  Id. 
 193. But see Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 100 
(1996) (stating the prohibitions against viewpoint discrimination arise from core First Amendment 
values).  Heins states: 
These values include the right to think, believe, and speak freely, the fostering of 
intellectual and spiritual growth, and the free exchange of ideas necessary to a properly 
functioning democracy.  Government action that suppresses or burdens speech on the 
basis of its viewpoint threatens all of these values by skewing public debate, retarding 
democratic change, depriving people of ideas and artistic experiences that could 
contribute to their growth, and otherwise constricting human liberty. 
Id. (citations omitted).  It can be argued that regulations of a commercial nature cannot be struck 
down under the doctrine of viewpoint discrimination because commercial speech is a lesser form of 
speech that was not based on core First Amendment values.  See generally, Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-
Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461, 468 
(1986) (noting anti-pornography legislation may be viewpoint based, but survive because it does not 
pose the usual dangers associated with viewpoint discrimination). 
 194. Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (finding St. Paul’s ordinance prevented only the subject of 
hate speech). 
 195. Cf. id. (holding that there was viewpoint discrimination because the ordinance prevented 
only hate speech on certain topics such as race, gender, and religion). 
 196. See id. 
 197. Bruce A. Grabow, Note, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: Dismantling Free Speech 
Jurisprudence to Make Room for Equal Treatment, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 577, 581 (1993) 
(discussing the need for a heightened analysis after the Court’s decision in R.A.V).  According to 
Grabow, “[i]t is the Court’s prerogative to commission new standards for constitutional review, 
[but] such discretionary decisions deserve to be analyzed closely.  This need for heightened analysis 
becomes even more apparent when the new approach creates more problems than it solves.”  Id. at 
582. 
 198. See infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text. 
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b.  Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia 
In later cases, the Court’s determination of what constitutes 
viewpoint discrimination became clearer.199  In Rosenberger, the Court 
stated that the government may not regulate speech based on its 
content.200  According to the Court, “[w]hen the government targets not 
subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the 
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”201  More 
importantly, the Court noted viewpoint discrimination is more evident 
when the state seeks to regulate speech that is reasonable in light of the 
forum in which it is presented.202 
Under the reasoning set forth in Rosenberger, the Massachusetts 
regulations would constitute viewpoint discrimination.203  First, the 
regulations sought to target particular views — the acceptance of 
                                                                                                                                 
 199. See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (discussing what constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination).  In Rosenberger, the Court determined the University of Virginia’s refusal to fund a 
newspaper because of its religious content was viewpoint discrimination.  Id. at 832. 
 200. Id. at 828.  Furthermore, the Court stated that discrimination based on the message of the 
speech is presumed unconstitutional.  Id.  However, in certain situations, the Court has held that the 
government may regulate speech based on content and viewpoint.  See Gitlow v. State of New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (finding a statute prohibiting criminal anarchy constitutional).  
According to the Gitlow Court: 
  It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the 
press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or 
publish, without  responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and 
unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents 
the punishment of those who abuse this freedom . . . . 
  That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this 
freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, 
incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question. 
Id. at 666-67 (citations omitted).  Arguably, restrictions such as the one in Gitlow would be 
unprotected under the incitement-to-riot or fighting words theories. 
 201. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (emphasis added).  Moreover, the Court stated “[v]iewpoint 
discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must abstain 
from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the 
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”  Id. 
 202. See Id.  According to the Court: 
[I]n determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has 
created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a 
distinction between,  on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be permissible 
if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint 
discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech 
otherwise within the forum’s limitations. 
Id. at 829-30. 
 203. See generally Helgi Walker, Note, Communications Media and the First Amendment: A 
Viewpoint Neutral FCC is Not Too Much to Ask For, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 5, 6 (2000) (stating most 
courts consider viewpoint discrimination to be particularly “egregious”). 
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smoking.204  Second, the government sought to regulate only tobacco-
related advertising.205  According to the Rosenberger Court, this would 
constitute viewpoint discrimination.206  It is easier to argue that the 
Massachusetts regulations are content-based;207 nevertheless, the 
regulations can be seen as viewpoint-based discrimination based on prior 
Supreme Court decisions.208 
B.  The Commercial Speech Doctrine Needs to Be Limited To 
Commercial Situations 
Although doubt exists as to whether Central Hudson is always the 
appropriate test, the Court has yet to “break new ground” and apply 
strict scrutiny to commercial regulations.209  This is problematic because 
                                                                                                                                 
 204. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 533 (2001) (stating the Attorney 
General’s purpose in creating the Massachusetts regulations was to prevent underage smoking).  See 
Amy Ruth Ita, Note, Censorial Community Values: An Unconstitutional Trend in Arts Funding and 
Access, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1725, 1728 (2000) (discussing the use of community values to censor art 
and how that is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination).  Viewpoint discrimination often arises in 
the case of government funding of arts.  See generally Harold B. Walther, Note, National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: Sinking Deeper Into the Abyss of the Supreme Court’s 
Unintelligible Modern Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 59 MD. L. REV. 225 (2000) 
(discussing the Supreme Court Holding in Finley and arguing that the decision limits and suppresses 
free speech).  The idea behind the state’s ability to withdraw funding for certain types of art is that 
the state cannot be forced to fund art that it deems indecent or disrespectful.  Barry J. Heyman, The 
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: The Supreme Court’s Artful Yet Indecent Proposal, 16 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 439, 446 (1999).  Although state funding is not an issue in Lorillard, the 
Massachusetts regulations were arguably enacted because the state sought to regulate behavior that 
it thought to be inconsistent with community values.  See supra Part III, notes 79-81. 
 205. See generally 940 CMR §§ 21.01 – 22.09 (2002). 
 206. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.  But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Takes a Narrow View 
of Viewpoint Discrimination, 35 MAR. TRIAL 90, 91 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court has 
never defined viewpoint discrimination). 
 207. See supra note 185 (arguing viewpoint discrimination is not applicable to speech of a 
commercial nature). 
 208. See supra  notes 186-206 and accompanying text. 
 209. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554.  Arguably, the commercial speech doctrine is not even 
necessary because courts would have appropriate discretion in applying a strict scrutiny standard.  
See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740-41 (1996) 
(discussing the competing interests between the state’s interests and those of the First Amendment).  
According to the Denver Court: 
  Over the years, [the] Court has restated and refined these basic First Amendment 
principles, adopting them more particularly to the balance of competing interests and the 
special circumstances of each field of application. 
  This tradition teaches that the First Amendment embodies an overarching 
commitment to protect speech from government regulation through close judicial 
scrutiny, thereby enforcing the Constitution’s constraints, but without imposing judicial 
formulas so rigid that they become a straightjacket that disables the government from 
responding to serious problems. 
Id.  (citations omitted). 
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even regulations of a commercial nature can be content-based, and hence 
deserving of a higher level of judicial scrutiny.210  A likely reason the 
Court is hesitant to change the level of scrutiny is that commercial 
speech is typically considered less deserving of constitutional 
protection.211  Central Hudson, however, should not be applied unless 
the regulation at issue is dealing with commercial harms.212 
1.  Commercial Harms 
According to Justice Thomas, it is important to apply Central 
Hudson only to those cases for which it was designed.213  The 
commercial speech doctrine, therefore, should be limited to the 
“particularly commercial harms that commercial speech can threaten . . . 
.”214  This would include commercial harms, such as illegal, deceptive, 
or misleading advertising.215  Alternatively, the commercial speech 
doctrine should be limited to those situations that do no more than 
                                                                                                                                 
 210. But see Mary B. Nutt, Recent Development, Trends in First Amendment Protection of 
Commercial Speech, 41 VAND. L. REV. 173, 174 (1988) (discussing how the Supreme Court affords 
commercial speech less protection because the Court is willing to defer to the state’s judgment). 
 211. Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).  In Fox, the 
Court was forced to determine whether speech proposing a commercial transaction was subject to 
Central Hudson, where that speech was combined with non-commercial speech.  Id. at 474.  The 
facts of the case were based on a University policy that prohibited private enterprises from soliciting 
on campus.  Id. at 471-72.  Respondents were prohibited from having a “Tupperware party” because 
of the University’s policy.  Id.  They argued that although there was a commercial component to the 
speech, it should not be subject to a Central Hudson analysis because there was also non-
commercial speech taking place.  Id. at 474.  The Court disagreed.  Id.  In noting the role the 
Constitution takes in protecting commercial speech, the Court stated “[o]ur jurisprudence has 
emphasized that ‘commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with 
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of 
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’”  Id. at 477 
(alteration in original) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). 
 212. See infra notes 213-233 and accompanying text. 
 213. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 576 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement).  
“Even when speech falls into a category of reduced constitutional protection, the government may 
not engage in content discrimination for reasons unrelated to those characteristics of the speech that 
place it within the category.”  Id.  The point of the commercial speech doctrine is to protect truthful, 
non-misleading speech even though there may be an economic motive on behalf of the speaker.  See 
generally Arlen W. Langvardt and Eric L. Richards, The Death of Posadas and the Birth of Change 
in[sic]Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44 Liquormart, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 483 (1997) 
(discussing the point of the commercial speech doctrine). 
 214. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 576 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement) 
(emphasis in original). 
 215. Id.  “Whatever power the State may have to regulate commercial speech, it may not use 
that power to limit the content of commercial speech as it has done here . . . . Such content-
discriminatory regulation — like all other content-based regulation of speech — must be subjected 
to strict scrutiny.”  Id. at 577. 
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propose a commercial transaction.216  The proper question is “not what 
qualifies commercial speech for First Amendment coverage, but what, if 
anything, disqualifies it?”217 
a.  Central Hudson Applies Only To Certain Forms of 
Advertising 
Certain cases would clearly qualify for Central Hudson because 
they do no more than propose a commercial transaction.218  For instance, 
in Virginia Pharmacy, the pharmacists sought to publish price 
information about prescription drugs.  This was the only message the 
advertisements were transmitting.219  Similarly, in Florida Bar v. Went 
For It, Inc., the lawyer advertisements sought only to solicit new 
business, and no other message was transmitted.220  Because false, 
deceptive, or misleading information is subject to regulation, it would 
only be appropriate to apply Central Hudson to those regulations that are 
                                                                                                                                 
 216. Rodney Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive 
Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993). 
Commercial speech, as speech, should presumptively enter the debate with full First 
Amendment protection . . . . The argument for even reducing the level of protection to 
the intermediate standard of review granted by existing First Amendment doctrine is 
theoretically sound only if applied to a limited subclass of advertising: that subclass of 
advertising that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” 
Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
762 (1976)). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 
(1980) (holding regulation which banned advertising by utility companies violated the First 
Amendment).  See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622 (1995) (holding state 
regulations designed to protect the privacy interests of victims did not violate the First 
Amendment); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763 (1993) (finding regulation prohibiting certified 
public accountants from direct in-person solicitation was unconstitutional); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 
191, 206-207 (1982) (holding restrictions on lawyers non-misleading speech was a violation of the 
First Amendment); Virginia Pharmacy, 434 U.S. at 750 (finding state regulation prohibiting the 
advertisement of prescriptions was unconstitutional). 
 219. Virginia Pharmacy, 434 U.S. at 760-61.  See generally Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding 
Awkward Alchemy — In the Off-Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully-Protected Independent 
Research Should Not Transmogrify Into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product 
Manufacturers Distribute It, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 967 (1999) (arguing that mere 
distribution of research by a product manufacturer should not result in the speech being treated as 
commercial speech). 
 220. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 621.  In Florida Bar, the state bar had restrictions on lawyer 
advertising.  Id. at 620.  The restrictions prohibiting lawyers from contacting victims, “unless the 
accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication.”  Id.  
This restriction was challenged on First Amendment grounds, but the Supreme Court upheld its 
validity.  Id. at 634.  The basis of the Court’s decision rested upon the state’s interest in protecting 
the privacy of its citizens.  Id. 
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designed to prevent commercial harms.221 
b.  Strict Scrutiny Should Otherwise Apply 
While Central Hudson should apply to some forms of commercial 
advertising, strict scrutiny should apply to others.222  When an advertiser 
promotes more than mere prices and services, the regulations should be 
subject to strict scrutiny, especially if there is a risk that the state is 
seeking to prohibit the advertising on the basis of its content.223  For 
instance, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the state sought to 
prohibit the unsolicited advertisement of contraceptive devices.224  
Although the Court analyzed the case under Central Hudson, it would 
have been more appropriate to apply strict scrutiny because the state 
sought to restrict the advertisements because it did not approve of the 
content.225 
Similarly, in Bigelow v. Virginia, the state regulations sought to 
prohibit the advertisement of abortions.226  Again, the Court analyzed the 
regulation under Central Hudson, but it would have been more 
appropriate to analyze it under strict scrutiny because the government’s 
purpose was to prohibit speech based solely on its content.227  Because 
                                                                                                                                 
 221. See In re R.M.J. at 455 U.S. at 203 (stating truthful advertising of lawful subjects is 
entitled to First Amendment protection). 
 222. See supra notes 141-208 and accompanying text (arguing the initial inquiry should be as 
to whether the regulations are content-based). 
 223. See Smolla, supra note 216, at 781.  According to Smolla: 
To the extent that advertisers are selling fantasies, lifestyles, identity, or anything other 
than ‘hard core’ transactional information, they are doing what all other speakers 
routinely do.  They are making these points, to be sure, out of utter self-interest; indeed, 
out of the most grasping of all forms of self-interest — the desire for financial profit.  
But the profit motive alone is not enough, either in First Amendment doctrine or theory, 
to disqualify speech from full constitutional protection. 
Id.  See also New York Times Co. v. L.B. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (finding the 
publication in question was not commercial because it did such things as communicate information 
and express opinions); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376, 384 (1973) (noting speech is not commercial merely because it relates to advertising). 
 224. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61 (1983). 
 225. See id. at 71.  The government’s purpose was to: (1) protect the recipients of these 
advertisements from information they may find offensive, and (2) help parents control the 
information their children have access to.  Id.  Ultimately, the Court found the regulations were in 
violation of the First Amendment.  Id. at 75. 
 226. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975). 
 227. Id. at 827.  The state argued its legitimate purpose was in regulating the quality of health 
care; however, the First Amendment would have been better served if the Court would have made a 
determination as to whether the regulation was content-based.  See supra notes 141-184 and 
accompanying text (arguing the First Amendment requires an initial inquiry into whether a 
regulation is content-based). 
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the purpose of the commercial speech doctrine is to protect consumers 
from such things as fraud or deception, “laws which attempt to limit 
commercial speech for some other purpose . . . can be valid only if they 
withstand full First Amendment scrutiny.”228 
c.  Preventing Commercial Harms 
The Massachusetts regulations are arguably within the ambit of the 
commercial speech doctrine because the stated purpose was to 
“eliminate deception and unfairness in the way cigarettes and smokeless 
tobacco products are marketed, sold and distributed. . . .”229  However, 
the regulations do more than merely attempt to prevent commercial 
harms.230  For instance, the Massachusetts regulations do not deal 
exclusively with preventing deception.  Moreover, the federal 
government has already legislated the issue of deception in the FCLA.231  
It is clear that the major portion of the regulations were designed to 
                                                                                                                                 
 228. Nicole B. Casarez, Don’t Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Commercial Speech and the 
First Amendment, 63 MO. L. REV. 929, 966 (1998) (stating it is a “more principled approach” to 
restrict commercial speech only to those situations where it prevents a purely commercial harm). 
 229. 940 CMR § 21.01.  The statute states: 
The purpose of 940 CMR [§] 2100 is to eliminate deception and unfairness in the way 
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products are marketed, sold and distributed in 
Massachusetts in order to address the incidence of cigarette smoking and smokeless 
tobacco use by children under legal age.  940 CMR [§] 21.00 imposes requirements and 
restrictions on the sale and distribution of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products in 
Massachusetts in order to prevent access to such products by underage consumers. 
Id.  The statement of purpose for the restrictions regarding cigars is essentially the same.  940 CMR 
§ 22.01.  However, the state also wanted to ensure that consumers were informed of the addictive 
nature of cigars.  Id.  According to the statute: 
The purpose of 940 CMR [§] 22.00 is to eliminate deception and unfairness in the way 
cigars and little cigars are packaged, marketed, sold and distributed in Massachusetts 
whereby: 
  (1) Massachusetts consumers may be adequately informed about the health risks 
associated with cigar smoking, its addictive properties, and the false perception that 
cigars are a safe alternative to cigarettes by requiring the cigar industry to include health 
warnings on the package labels of cigars sold and distributed within Massachusetts and 
in the advertisement of such products within Massachusetts; and 
  (2) the incidence of cigar use by children under legal age is addressed by imposing 
requirements and restrictions on the sale and distribution of cigars in Massachusetts in 
order to prevent access to such products by underage consumers. 
Id. 
 230. See Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection 
for Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 
598 (2000) (discussing the measure of First Amendment protection afforded to commercial speech).  
Commercial harms come from false, misleading advertisement, or from the advertisement of illegal 
products.  See id. 
 231. See supra note 7 (discussing federal legislation and regulation of tobacco products). 
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prevent children from seeing tobacco advertisements.232  Because the 
regulations do not address purely commercial harms, the commercial 
speech doctrine should not have been applied.233 
2.  No Clear Rationale 
According to Justice Thomas, the Court has been inconsistent in 
applying the commercial speech doctrine.234  This is in part because 
there is no basis for asserting that commercial speech is deserving of a 
lower level of constitutional protection.235  In contrast, there is a firm 
                                                                                                                                 
 232. See 940 CMR §§ 21.01 – 22.09 (2002).  A fundamental problem with the Massachusetts 
regulations is the regulations also prevent adults from seeing tobacco advertisements.  See Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 580 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
judgement).  The Court has often recognized that despite the state’s interest in protecting children 
from harmful materials, the First Amendment does not justify broad suppressions of speech.  See, 
e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (holding certain restrictions on the transmission of 
obscene materials over the internet were unconstitutional restrictions on speech).  The Supreme 
Court has stated that it has “repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children 
from harmful materials.  But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of 
speech addressed to adults.”  Id. at 875 (citations omitted).  Generally speaking, however, the State 
will be allowed to restrict youth access to those products that are deemed obscene.  See Ginsberg v. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (noting even constitutionally protected material may be 
regulated when it comes to protecting children). 
 233. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 577 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement). 
 234. Id. at 574 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement).  According to Justice 
Thomas,  “[t]here was once a time when this Court declined to give any First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech . . . . That position was repudiated  . . . . Since then, the Court has 
followed an uncertain course – much of the uncertainty being generated by the malleability of the 
four-part balancing test of Central Hudson.”  Id.  In fact, the Court itself has stated the Central 
Hudson test is not “entirely discrete.”  Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 
U.S. 173, 183-84 (1999).  This means all four prongs of the Central Hudson test are “interrelated.”  
Id.  Moreover: 
Each raises a relevant question that may not be dispositive to the First Amendment 
inquiry, but the answer to which may inform a judgment concerning the other three.  
Partly because of these intricacies [many petitioners, judges, and scholars] have 
advocated repudiation of the Central Hudson standard and implementation of a more 
straightforward and stringent test for assessing the validity of governmental restrictions 
on commercial speech. 
Id. 
 235. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in judgement).  According to Justice Thomas, 
I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that “commercial” speech is 
of a “lower value” than “noncommercial” speech . . . . Nor do I believe that the only 
explanations that the Court has ever advanced for treating “commercial” speech 
differently from other speech can justify restricting “commercial” speech in order to 
keep information from legal purchasers so as to thwart what would otherwise be their 
choices in the marketplace. 
Id.  In Lorillard, Justice Thomas went on to state he doubted “whether it is even possible to draw a 
coherent distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech.”  Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 575 
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basis for arguing that strict scrutiny should be applied to content-based 
regulations — the First Amendment, which prohibits the state from 
restricting free speech.236  Arguably, the Court has been inconsistent in 
applying the commercial speech doctrine because there is no clear 
rationale behind it.237 
                                                                                                                                 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgement). 
 236. But see Jo-Jo Baldwin, Note,  No Longer that Crazy Aunt in the Basement, Commercial 
Speech Joins the Family, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 163, 166 (1997) (stating there is 
disagreement over how to interpret the First Amendment).  According to Baldwin: 
[T]he framers did not clarify how to fulfill the promise of free speech in America, and 
people disagree about the types of speech the First Amendment protects and the forms of 
government action it prohibits.  As a result, the guarantee of free speech has not received 
a literal reading in American jurisprudence, and the United States Supreme Court has 
produced a catalogue of balancing tests and speech categories that determines the 
boundaries of our right to freedom of speech. 
Id. 
 237. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 519-22 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
judgement) (discussing the inconsistent ways in which Central Hudson has been applied by the 
Court).  Moreover, 
  Unlike core First Amendment speech, commercial speech has only recently been 
given constitutional protection.  The United States Supreme Court has defined 
commercial speech as speech that relates solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.  Needless to say, the Supreme Court’s definition is problematic. 
  The problem is that speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services 
has a protean quality.  First, the line separating commercial from noncommercial speech 
is nebulous.  Speech is sometimes directed toward making the world a better place, 
sometimes toward making a profit, and frequently toward a combination of both.  Absent 
resort to arbitrary distinctions that elevate form over substance, the difference between 
speech incident to the sale of products which possesses ideological overtones, and 
speech incident to the sale of ideas which encourages product sales, is often difficult to 
discern. 
Leonard J. Nannarone, Jr. Esq., Move Over Joe Camel: Governmental Attempts to Ban Tobacco 
Advertising, 45 R.I. BAR JNL. 11, 11 (1997).  Nannarone continues by noting the category 
“commercial speech” is arbitrary.  Id.  He argues that it is both too large and yet too small.  Id. 
  This special subset is simultaneously too large, in that it encompasses 
noncommercial information dressed up as commercial advertising, and too small in that 
it fails to encompass related variations of speech incident to the sale or promotion of 
goods and services . . . . 
  Even assuming that commercial speech can be defined, it is difficult to determine 
what amount of constitutional protection it deserves.  Commercial speech is a hybrid of 
commerce and speech.  It is related both to the sale of goods and services and to the 
ideas about those goods and services.  As it relates to the sale or promotion of those 
goods and services, it occupies to so-called marketplace of goods and services, where 
government regulation is regarded as presumptively valid.  On the other hand as it relates 
to speech and ideological expression, it occupies the marketplace of ideas, where 
content-based government regulation has traditionally been regarded as inherently 
suspect. 
Id at 11-12. 
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3.  No Consistent Standard 
The Supreme Court may have had the best First Amendment 
intentions when it enacted the Central Hudson test.238  However, the 
Court has not been able to apply the test consistently.239  The test may be 
too complicated, especially in light of modern society.240  In addition, 
the test is highly subjective, encouraging variations in judicial 
interpretation.241  Because the Court cannot analyze cases under Central 
Hudson with any sort of predictability, it should not try to force content-
based regulations into an intermediate scrutiny analysis.242  Doing so 
further dissolves Central Hudson and ineffectively protects the First 
Amendment rights of the speaker.243 
                                                                                                                                 
 238. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-66.  The Court apparently went through great effort 
to come up with a test that balanced the interests of all those concerned.  See id.  In creating the 
four-part test, the Court acknowledged the rights of the speaker and the listener, while at the same 
time acknowledging the rights of the state.  Id. 
 239. See also supra Part II, notes 60-74 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Aaron A. Schmoll, 
Sobriety Test: The Court Walks the Central Hudson Line Once Again in 44 Liquormart, But Passes 
on a New First Amendment Review, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 753, 754 (1998).  “If one were to consider 
the intermediate-level scrutiny given commercial speech as a straight line, the Supreme Court has 
barely been able to walk it without tripping over its precedents during the past fifteen years.”  Id. 
 240. Schmoll, supra note 239, at 754-55. 
[T]he Central Hudson test is too complicated and manipulable to provide any certainty 
of protection. . . . [A]s society becomes more commercialized, the distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial becomes obscure.  Today’s political statement is 
tomorrow’s Web-page endorsement.  The nature of speech is one of multiple meanings, 
and it would be contrary to the intent of the First Amendment to reduce speech to its 
lowest common denominator. 
Id. 
 241. See id. (arguing the last two prongs of the Central Hudson test are subjective). 
 242. See id. at 772-73. 
The Court historically has had difficulty analyzing commercial speech.  Since the middle 
of this century, protection for commercial speech has improved from none to some level 
of intermediate scrutiny.  The importance of advertising has seemingly improved in the 
minds of the Justices, while the Court has begun to more carefully consider the state’s 
motivation for regulation.  However, the road the Court has taken . . . since the adoption 
of Central Hudson, fails to consider consistently opposing these forces.  In one instance, 
the Court embraces the state-sponsored paternalism; it sees through it and discards it in 
the next.  Only by adopting an absolute, less-manipulable test can the Court avoid the 
pitfalls of its own creation. 
Id. 
 243. But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The 
Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 124 (1996) (stating the Court has recently 
found in favor of the advertiser for First Amendment challenges).  Where desired, Central Hudson 
will allow content-based regulations to undergo only an intermediate scrutiny analysis.  Id. at 156. 
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C.  The Government Interest 
Often the government will have a valid interest at stake.244  
However, it is more important to see that First Amendment safeguards 
are afforded to the speaker, especially when the government seeks to 
regulate speech on the basis of content.245  Applying strict scrutiny to 
content-based regulations will protect any valid interest the government 
may have, and it will also protect the speaker’s First Amendment 
rights.246  The government is free to protect its interest by drafting 
regulations that will pass strict scrutiny, or alternatively, it can enact 
content-neutral regulations.247 
1.  Passing the Strict Scrutiny Test 
Government regulations that are content-based can still pass strict 
scrutiny.248  To pass strict scrutiny, the government would merely have 
to design regulations that are narrowly tailored and that have no less 
restrictive alternative.249  The Massachusetts regulations, as they stood, 
would not have passed strict scrutiny because of how they were 
drafted.250 
                                                                                                                                 
 244. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001) (finding the state’s 
interest in preventing underage smoking was substantial).  See also supra Part I, notes 3-5 and 11-
13 (noting the increase in tobacco consumption by minors and the devastating consequences of 
tobacco addiction). 
 245. But see Sullivan, supra note 243, at 129 (stating there are those who feel that commercial 
speech deserves no “robust protection at all”).  See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text 
(discussing the importance and meaning behind the First Amendment). 
 246. But see Nannarone, supra note 237 at 44 (noting tobacco advertising bans would likely 
fail even Central Hudson if it was applied more strictly); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, 
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418 (1996) 
(arguing a better approach would be a per se ban on content-based regulations because the Court is 
inconsistent in applying strict scrutiny). 
 247. See infra notes 257-265 and accompanying text (discussing how the Massachusetts 
regulations could be content-neutral). 
 248. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 195 (1992) (finding strict scrutiny satisfied 
for a content-based regulation that aimed to prohibit individuals from campaigning within one 
hundred feet of an election polling place).  The regulation at issue in Burson was content based.  Id. 
at 198.  In fact, it was a “facially content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum . . . 
.”  Id.  Yet, the Court found the statute to be constitutional because the state met its burden of 
proving a compelling interest that was narrowly tailored, with no less restrictive means available.  
Id. at 199-211. 
 249. U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (discussing strict scrutiny 
and holding that restrictions requiring cable operators to scramble sexually explicit programs, or to 
restrict such programming to certain hours, failed the strict scrutiny test because there were less 
restrictive means). 
 250. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in judgement) (noting the Massachusetts regulations would have failed even 
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However, Massachusetts’ “1,000 foot rule” may have been drafted 
in such a way as to pass strict scrutiny.251  First, assume the State of 
Massachusetts had a compelling interest in trying to prevent underage 
smoking.252  Second, assume the regulation did not require a blanket rule 
prohibiting tobacco advertising within one thousand feet of playgrounds, 
public parks, or schools.  Rather, the regulation prohibited such 
advertising within direct sight of those areas where children typically 
play or gather.253  Third, assume the State of Massachusetts had already 
taken steps to regulate all other non-speech methods of preventing 
underage tobacco consumption.254  Perhaps, then, the regulations could 
have passed a strict scrutiny.255  However, even if a state cannot draft 
                                                                                                                                 
intermediate scrutiny). 
 251. See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (discussing the necessary elements of strict 
scrutiny). 
 252. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561.  But see id. at 582 (Thomas, J. concurring in part, concurring 
in judgement) (“Massachusetts asserts a compelling interest in reducing tobacco use among minors.  
Applied to adults, an interest in manipulating market choices by keeping people ignorant would not 
be legitimate, let alone compelling.”).  Id. 
 253. See id. at 584.  According to Justice Thomas, the majority was correct in finding the 
“1,000 foot” rule was not narrowly tailored because it was arbitrary.  Id.  Thomas, however, went 
further in his analysis when he stated: 
A prohibited zone defined solely by circles drawn around schools and playgrounds is 
necessarily overinclusive, regardless of the radii of the circles.  Consider, for example, a 
billboard located within [one thousand] feet of a school, but visible only from an 
elevated freeway that runs nearby.  Such a billboard would not threaten any of the 
interests respondents assert, but it would be banned anyway, because the regulations take 
no account of whether the advertisement could even be seen by children. 
Id. at 585.  See also William E. Lee, The Unwilling Listener: Hill v. Colorado’s Chilling Effect on 
Unorthodox Speech, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 387, 390 (2002) (comparing the tailoring of the 
regulations in Hill and the regulations in Lorillard and examining the Court’s holding on this issue 
as compared to the two cases). 
 254. According to Justice Thomas: 
In addition to examining a narrower advertising ban, the State should have examined 
ways of advancing its interest that [did] not require limiting speech at all.  Here, [the 
State] had several alternatives.  Most obviously, they could have directly regulated the 
conduct with which they were concerned.  Massachusetts already prohibits the sale of 
tobacco to minors, but it could take steps to enforce that prohibition more vigorously.  It 
also could enact laws prohibiting the purchase, possession, or use of tobacco by minors.  
And, if its concern is that tobacco advertising communicates a message with which it 
disagrees, it could seek to counteract that message with “more speech, not enforced 
silence.” 
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J. concurring in part, concurring in judgement) (citations 
omitted).  See also Sullivan, supra note 243, at 160 (arguing the states can seek to achieve the same 
goals by other means).  According to Sullivan, the states “might achieve the same consumer 
protection goals through direct regulation of production and sales, shifting means but not altering 
ends.” Id. 
 255. But see Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J. concurring) (arguing that to uphold 
regulations on tobacco would call into question other types of advertising that produced harmful 
effects).  Justice Thomas stated: 
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regulations to pass strict scrutiny, it can enact content-neutral 
regulations.256 
2.  The O’Brien Test for Content Neutral Regulations 
Even if the Commonwealth of Massachusetts could not have 
satisfied the strict scrutiny test with its content-based regulations, it 
would not be left without means to protect its interest.257  States are free 
to enact content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.258  Such 
                                                                                                                                 
  [I]t seems appropriate to point out that to uphold . . . tobacco regulations would be to 
accept a line of reasoning that would permit restrictions on advertising for a host of other 
products. . . .  Tobacco use is, we are told, “the single leading cause of preventable death 
in the United States.”  The second largest contributor to mortality rates in the United 
States is obesity. . . .  Respondents say that tobacco companies are covertly targeting 
children in their advertising.  Fast food companies do so openly.  Moreover, there is 
considerable evidence that they have been successful in changing children’s eating 
behavior . . . . So even though fast food is not addictive in the same way tobacco is, 
children’s exposure to fast food advertising can have deleterious consequences that are 
difficult to reverse. 
Id. at 587-88 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  Justice Thomas continues by making a 
similar analogy to alcohol.  Id. at 588.  He mentions alcohol related problems and notes children 
oftentimes view alcohol advertising, and yet the state did not place such comparable restrictions on 
its advertising.  Id.  He concludes by noting that Massachusetts had “identified no principle of law 
or logic that would preclude the imposition of restrictions on fast food and alcohol advertising 
similar to those they seek to impose on tobacco advertising.”  Id. at 589.  See also Mark R. 
Ludwikowsi, Proposed Government Regulation of Tobacco Advertising Uses Teens to Disguise 
First Amendment Violations, 4 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 105, 110 (1996) (discussing the argument 
that not all advertising of harmful products can be banned). 
 256. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (holding an 
ordinance prohibiting camping in parks did not violate the First Amendment).  Generally speaking: 
Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable 
time, place, or manner restrictions.  [The Supreme Court] has often noted that 
restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they leave open  ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information. 
Id. at 293 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 257. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (establishing a test for content-
neutral regulations); Stan M. Weber, Note, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 
157, 164 (1995) (discussing content-neutral regulations as compared to content-based restrictions). 
 258. See Weber, supra note 257, at 164.  Content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions 
are those that regulate speech without taking into consideration the content of the speech.  Id.  
“Often these restrictions aim at the noncommunicative aspects speech.”  Id.  See also City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 290 (2000) (finding an ordinance prohibiting nude dancing was not 
targeting erotic expression, but public nudity in general).  But see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
412 (1989) (finding strict scrutiny applies to content-based non-speech restrictions). Certain 
restrictions that are seemingly content-neutral can be subject to strict scrutiny if those restrictions 
intend to restrict conduct intended to express an idea.  Id. at 404.  According to the Johnson Court: 
The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of “speech,” but we have 
long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word.  While we 
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regulations, which are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, are 
constitutional if they pass the test set forth in O’Brien.259  Basically, 
content-neutral regulations must further an important or substantial 
government interest, be unrelated to the suppression of free speech, be 
no greater than essential, and allow alternative means of 
communication.260 
The Massachusetts regulations were not content-neutral.261  This is 
not to say the government could not have drafted a content-neutral set of 
regulations.262  It would have been possible for the government to have 
adopted restrictions on all forms of advertising.263  For instance, the 
government could have attempted to prohibit the advertisement of all 
adult products within a certain area of parks, playgrounds and schools.264  
However, it must be noted that a state choosing to blindly wipe out all 
forms of advertising must have an extremely substantial interest, because 
                                                                                                                                 
have rejected “the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an 
idea,” we have acknowledged that conduct may be “sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication to fall within the scope of the [First Amendment].” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 259. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; supra note 32 (discussing the test for content-neutral time, 
place, and manner restrictions). 
 260. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 261. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 574 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in judgement).  Although Justice Thomas did not analyze the Massachusetts regulations 
under intermediate scrutiny, he did note they were not content-neutral restrictions.  Id. 
 262. Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000) (holding a regulation prohibiting all 
speech within one hundred feet of a healthcare facility was a valid restriction of time, place, and 
manner).  In Hill, the State of Colorado enacted a statute, which made it unlawful for one person to 
approach another, without consent, for the purpose of “passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a 
sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person. . . .”  Id. at 707.  
While the statute did not regulate the content of the prohibited speech, it made it more difficult for 
persons to give unsolicited advice.  Id.  The Court found the statute constitutional for three reasons.  
Id. at 719.  First, the Court stated it was not a regulation of speech, but a regulation of place.  Id.  
Second, the Court noted that the regulation was not adopted in order to prohibit any particular 
message.  Id.  Third, the Court found the state had a valid interest in protecting a person’s rights to 
access and privacy and providing police with clear guidelines.  Id. at 719-20. 
 263. But see, Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 580 (Thomas, J. concurring in part, concurring in 
judgement).  According to Justice Thomas, a state cannot blindly restrict advertising.  See id.  “Even 
if [a state] has a valid interest in regulating speech directed at children — who, it argues, may be 
more easily mislead . . . it may not pursue that interest at the expense of the free speech rights of 
adults.”  Id. 
 264. But see id.  According to Justice Thomas, “[i]t is difficult to see any stopping point to a 
rule that would allow a State to prohibit all speech in favor of an activity in which it is illegal for 
minors to engage.”  Id.  However, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court held the government 
had a valid interest in protecting children from an offensive radio broadcast.  438 U.S. 726, 749 
(1978).  The Court’s holding seemed to be based on the accessibility of the material.  See id. at 749-
50.  According to the Court, “[t]he ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast 
material . . . justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting.”  Id. at 750. 
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the First Amendment rights of adult listeners would be at stake.265 
3.  No “Vice” Exception 
“The extent to which government ought to regulate the promotion 
of so-called ‘vice’ products like tobacco and alcohol, and activities such 
as gambling, is one of the most controversial contemporary advertising 
issues.”266  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has refused to apply a 
“vice” exception to the commercial speech doctrine.267  Because there is 
                                                                                                                                 
 265. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1998) (finding a statute 
prohibiting the mailing of contraceptive information unconstitutional).  In Bolger, the Court was 
forced to decide whether a statute prohibiting a person from mailing information relating to 
contraception was unconstitutional.  Id. at 61.  In finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court 
looked at the state’s interest and the interests of the adult listener.  Id. at 68-75.  In an oft-cited 
statement, Justice Marshall noted “[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be 
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.”  Id. at 74.  Moreover, the Court has noted 
certain restrictions, designed to protect minors, can be overbroad.  See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 
380, 383-84 (1957).  In Butler, the Court found a Michigan statute regulating adult materials was 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 384.  According to the Court, “The State insists that by . . . quarantining the 
general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield 
juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare.  Surely, this is to burn 
the house to roast the pig.”  Id. at 383. (emphasis added). 
 266. Michael Hoefges and Milgros Rivera-Sanchez, “Vice” Advertising Under the Supreme 
Court’s Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Commercial Speech Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT L.J 345, 347 (2000).  According to Hoefges and Rivera-Sanchez: 
Advertisers spend massive amounts of money each year seeking customers for legal 
products such as cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, beer, wine, and distilled spirits; and 
lawful gambling facilities such as state lotteries, private and public casinos, and horse 
and dog racing tracks, among others. 
  Often, when federal or state governments seek to curtail the potentially harmful 
effects of these products and activities, restrictions on advertising are politically 
attractive. The legislative rationale often assumes that curtailing advertising for a product 
like alcohol, for instance, will dampen consumer demand and thus alleviate social costs 
related to harmful secondary effects, like alcoholism. 
Id. 
 267. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482, n. 2 (1995) (suggesting it would be 
difficult to define a “vice” exception to the Central Hudson test).  See generally P. Cameron 
Devore, First Amendment Protection of “Vice” Advertising: Current Commercial Speech Hot 
Buttons, 15 COMM. LAW. 3 (discussing the First Amendment and how the Court has applied it to the 
so-called “vices”).  It is also important to note that once something is deemed a “vice” and its 
advertising is prohibited, the possibility of a slippery slope becomes great.  Ludwikowsi, supra note 
255, at 110.  If restrictions, such as tobacco restrictions are implemented,  
[W]ill the simple appearance of cigarettes in movies or on television thereafter be 
banned because celebrities smoking may negatively influence children?  It is not 
improbable to suspect that a ban on tobacco advertising [would] lead to gags on 
manufacturers of other products that at any given time may be considered politically 
incorrect. 
Id.  Moreover, the government may not act as a censor.  Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 
205, 209 (1975).  In discussing the effects of certain types of speech upon the unwilling listener, the 
Erznoznik Court stated: 
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no vice exception, the argument that strict scrutiny should apply to 
content-based restrictions of a commercial nature is even stronger 
because states will undoubtedly attempt to circumvent Central Hudson 
to prohibit the advertising of so-called “vices.”268 
D.  Strict Scrutiny Prevents the Erosion of First Amendment Principles 
It is important that the Court strike a balance between valid, 
legitimate government interests and maintainence of First Amendment 
safeguards.269  The First Amendment focuses not only on the rights of 
the speaker, but also on the rights of the listener.270 It is important the 
listener have access to truthful, non-misleading information in order to 
prevent government encroachment on individual rights.271  Strict 
scrutiny would ensure that the principles of the First Amendment are 
                                                                                                                                 
A State or municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time, 
place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content.  But when 
the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some 
kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First 
Amendment strictly limits its power. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 268. See generally Kathleen E. Burke, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. 
United States: Broadcasters Have Lady Luck, or At Least the First Amendment, on Their Side, 35 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 471, 497-99 (2001) (discussing the government’s attempts at circumventing 
Central Hudson by way of a “vice” exception). 
 269. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text (discussing the importance and history of the First 
Amendment). 
 270. See Robert T. Cahill, Jr., Casenote, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.: 
Towards Heightened Scrutiny For Truthful Commercial Speech?, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 225, 252 
(1994) (stating it is important for commercial speech regulations to be examined from the listener’s 
perspective).  Cahill advises that the Court adopt a three-tiered approach to analyzing commercial 
speech regulations.  Id.  He proposes that: 
The first tier pertains to commercial speech that is untruthful, misleading, coercive, or 
related to an unlawful activity.  Regulations which suppress this type of commercial 
speech will be upheld by the Court so long as the state has a rational basis to conclude 
that the regulation advances the state’s interest in preventing untruthful speech.  The 
second tier involves regulations “designed to protect consumers from misleading or 
coercive speech” or a regulation seeking to remedy the secondary effects of misleading 
speech.  These regulations are entitled to Central Hudson’s intermediate level of 
scrutiny.  The third tier involves regulations that suppress “truthful commercial speech 
designed to serve some other government purpose.”  These regulations will only be 
upheld if the regulation survives strict scrutiny. 
. . . 
Because the listener has a substantial interest in hearing truthful, commercial speech, 
commercial speech deserves a high level of judicial scrutiny. 
Id. at 251-52 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 271. Cf. John M. Faust, Note, Of Saloons and Social Control: Assessing the Impact of State 
Liquor Control on Individual Expression, 80 VA. L. REV. 745, 745-46 (1994) (arguing attempts by 
the government to institute controls on liquor allow a “quiet intrusion” on individual rights). 
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upheld by forcing states to prove the necessity of any proposed 
regulations and by ensuring that the state regulates speech only as a last 
resort.272 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should apply strict scrutiny to content-based 
regulations.  It is not enough for the Court to apply the watered-down 
commercial speech doctrine every time profit motivates the speaker.  
Surely the State may have a valid interest in regulating speech.  The 
State’s interest in Lorillard was valid — even noble.  But the 
Massachusetts regulations were content-based and should have been 
analyzed as such.  Hopefully, the next time the Court decides this issue it 
will follow Justice Thomas’ lead.  He was correct in his analysis of 
Lorillard.  He is also correct when he noted that: 
No legislature has ever sought to restrict speech about an activity it 
regarded as harmless and inoffensive.  Calls for limits on expression 
always are made when the specter of some threatened harm is looming.  
The identity of the harm may vary.  People will be inspired by 
totalitarian dogmas and subvert the Republic.  They will be inflamed 
by racial demagoguery and embrace hatred and bigotry.  Or they will 
be enticed by cigarette advertisements and choose to smoke, risking 
disease.  It is therefore no answer for the State to say that the makers of 
cigarettes are doing harm: perhaps they are.  But in that respect they 
are no different from the purveyors of other harmful products, or the 
advocates of harmful ideas.  When the State seeks to silence them, they 
are all entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.273 
Kerri L. Keller 
                                                                                                                                 
 272. But see Timothy R. Mortimer, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island: A Toast to the First 
Amendment, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1049, 1091-92 (1998) (stating that it is unlikely the Court will 
abandon Central Hudson in favor of strict scrutiny).  However, Mortimer notes “the level of 
scrutiny under which the Central Hudson test is applied is in question.”  Id. at 1091.  Moreover, he 
states that “the Court’s current trend is toward, although still shy of, affording commercial speech 
the same level of protection other forms of protected speech enjoy.”  Id. at 1092. 
 273. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 590 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in judgement). 
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